The Lost City of Solidarity:  
Metropolitan Unionism in Historical Perspective  

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The New Deal labor relations system, cobbled together between 1933 and 1947, was premised on the security of long-term “family wage” employment in the mass-production core of a growing national economy. Into the 1960s (at least for those workers it reached), the mid-century innovations in labor law (the Wagner Act) and labor organization (the Congress of Industrial Organizations) delivered job security, stable wages, and an increasingly expansive system of private social provision. As the postwar era wore on, however, the economic and demographic and political premises of the New Deal order began to fall apart. Today, the United States is more and more dependent on a global economy in which it wields less and less political or economic clout. Relatively secure manufacturing employment has been increasingly displaced by high-turnover service employment. While “family wage” assumptions still cloud social policy, it is now both an expectation and a necessity that most women participate in the labor force. American labor laws and labor strategy, in short, are designed for a world in which we no longer live. In one respect at least, this leaves us where we were in the early 1930s -- with a labor policy and a labor movement which are relics of an earlier era, and which are ill-equipped to meet the organizational needs and aspirations of most working people.

As a means of at least partially addressing the troubling incongruity between the institutions of the 1940s and the economy of the 1990s, we turn our attention to the promise of “metropolitan unionism.” In its broadest sense, “metro unionism” denotes an organizing strategy which focuses political and economic attention on the nation’s long-neglected urban regions. Such urban regions offer a density of skills and resources which could and should facilitate sustainable economic development, high wages, and the provision of public goods. Instead, we are caught in a vicious cycle of anti-urban political neglect, smokestack-chasing by job- and tax-anxious cities, and further urban decay. Local organizing can, of course, make a difference -- by building a “living wage” floor under the local economy, targeting tax incentives to “high road” development, adjusting tax policies in the interest of regional economic stability, and the like. In such efforts, urban locals and Central Labor Councils or City Federations are crucial -- not only because working women and men have so much at stake, but because (for reasons I touch on below) organized labor has long neglected its natural leadership in the urban political economy.

In this essay, I employ the idea of “metro unionism” in a narrower (and more literal) sense to simply denote a form of collective bargaining which groups workers by region and occupation rather than by worksite and industry. I do this for three reasons, none of which involve any doubt or question about the broader project of grassroots urban renewal. First, my interest here is primarily in teasing out the history of labor’s urban experience and urban strategy. In that history, it is patterns of genuinely metropolitan bargaining by industry or occupation which stand out as the important (and useful) precedents. Second, I think it important to underscore the strategic and legal tensions inherent in the “metro unions” or “union cities”
approach, which follow from that history: as I suggest below, the New Deal collective bargaining model -- sometimes in law and sometimes in spirit -- has both discouraged new organization along unconventional (regional or occupational rather than industrial) lines and discouraged established unions from looking beyond the horizon of plant, firm, and industry. And third, I think it important to underscore the promise (in some sectors at least) of forms of bargaining which pursue employment security in regional labor markets (rather than job security in internal labor markets), explode the assumption that collective bargaining is somehow irreconcilable with service employment, retrieve some of the natural solidarities which flowed across industrial and jurisdictional lines before vertically-organized national and international unions dominated the landscape of both collective bargaining and labor politics and, in doing all of this, meet the organizational needs of those workers (especially women) frustrated by both historical patterns of craft and industrial unionism and contemporary patterns of service employment.

All of this, of course, raises a number of questions: What might such unions look like? What changes in the law would encourage and accommodate such efforts? What would metropolitan unions accomplish? As an historian, the best I can do in answering such questions is to ask them in a different way. In what ways does the idea and practice of “metropolitan unionism” claim important historical precedents? Under what circumstances did metropolitan unions, of one form or another, flourish? How and why did these alternatives to the New Deal model founder?

1. Metropolitan Unions in the United States

For the most part, the history of metro unions has been trumped by the core narrative of American labor history: the struggle between craft and industrial unionism before and after 1935. In this view, American Federation of Labor (AFL) unions are portrayed as bastions of skilled male workers, fiercely devoted to a masculine, racist, and voluntarist construction of labor relations and labor policy. The Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), by contrast, is the hero of the story; celebrated for its willingness and ability to jump at the opportunity presented by the Depression and New Deal and build a movement of socially-conscious and politically-engaged industrial unionism. But the CIO is also a tragic hero whose flaws include uneven attention to the rights of African-American and female workers, a debilitating dependence on the federal state, an abusive relationship with the Democratic Party, and bureaucratic alienation from its own rank and file.

While there is much to recommend this account, it tends to lose sight of occupational and metropolitan patterns of organizing which resembled neither the aristocracy of skill nurtured by the AFL, nor the “silos of solidarity” built by the CIO.

There are a number of patterns or examples of metropolitan unionism in the American experience, some of which involve the structure and practice of collective bargaining and some of which involve broader, cross-sectoral political efforts. On the bargaining side, there have been three distinct patterns of metropolitan unionism, dictated largely by structure of the industries and labor markets in question. The first of these occurred in skilled service industries, especially construction. Unions in these industries were, in some respects, classical craft unions in terms of both their benefits (apprenticeships systems and control over labor markets) and their limits (a disdain for unskilled workers and often systematic racism). But they were also distinct in two respects: they operated in discrete and bounded metropolitan markets; and they governed the
terms of employment (through the contracting system) on an occupational rather than worksite basis. Other unions of skilled workers, including musicians, followed roughly the same model.

The second important pattern occurred in unskilled service trades, including municipal employees, teamsters, waitresses, and various building service trades. The distinction between skilled and unskilled, in this respect, is not clear cut: the former certainly exaggerated their privileged position in the labor market; and the latter organized, in part, as a way of arguing for occupational or professional status. Such services were, like construction, naturally insulated from external competition. But unions of delivery drivers, janitors, elevator operators and the like depended less on their craft status than on their ability or willingness to control their respective labor markets, and their critical (and often closely related) positions in the infrastructure of the city. Unlike the building trades, in other words, these unions usually depended upon the strength and mutual support offered by other metropolitan unions.

The third pattern occurred in local manufacturing -- including baking, brewing, printing, and clothing manufacture -- which served a distinct metropolitan market. These industries were largely insulated from external competition, usually because the distribution (bread, keg beer) beyond city limits was impractical, because regional or national markets (for bottled beer or ready-to-wear clothing, for example) were not yet established, or because (as in printing) local production rested on close contractual ties with other local firms. These industries were also often intensely competitive within the metropolitan market, and unions (which could take wages out of competition and discipline cutthroat firms) often played an important regulatory role. In industries such as the needle trades, for example, unions regulated both local labor markets and competition among firms to the advantage of workers, the metropolitan economy, and all but the “sweatshop” contractors and employers.

There were, of course, peculiar and pervasive obstacles to organizing in such settings. The diversity of worksites and work experiences, the organizational disarray of employers, and the itinerant character of service work all worked against the natural solidarities which flowed from industrial employment. Yet such unions did succeed, in part by serving the needs of their members and in part by serving the needs of employers. For workers, occupational unionism promised access to the labor market, portable employment rights and benefits, and a collective voice in their confrontation with employers. For at least some employers, metropolitan unions served as a source of reliable labor, and proved useful in efforts to identify and regulate marginal or cutthroat firms.

Beyond such patterns of local bargaining, metropolitan unionism took political forms as well. In some respects, this meant little more than the fact that local unions could and would support each other by mutually respecting picket lines and ensuring that municipal goods and services flowed through union hands. More broadly, it often meant that local unions could and would pool their talents and resources in the provision of services to their members: perhaps the best example, in this respect, are the multi-union health centers established (before the triumph of pattern-bargained and privately insured health benefits) in cities like Philadelphia, Milwaukee, and San Francisco. And, in some settings, it meant that local unions would and could forge a distinct identity and agenda in local politics. Such efforts, as I suggest below, were complicated (and often frustrated) by the constraints of both local machine politics and national partisan politics. But they were nevertheless important episodes in the history of American labor and in the history of American cities.
By any measure, metropolitan unions of one kind or another comprised an important fragment of the labor movement before and after the emergence of the CIO. Some, such as the construction trades, would remain important. Some, such as the garment trades, gradually lost their metropolitan focus. Some, such as the janitor and waitress unions, lost ground gradually after impressive organizational successes in at least some settings. Some, such as the meager retail clerks unions, closely reflected modern dilemmas in the organization of service workers. And some, such as the local labor parties which flourished briefly in many cities (especially in the early 1930s) suggested how difficult it was to sustain meaningful local alliances in an era in which national unions, national politics, and national political parties offered compelling alternatives. In any case, the uneven history and lost promise of such unions begs an explanation.

2. What Happened to Metropolitan Unionism?

Historians have (not surprisingly) devoted much more attention to the development of New Deal labor law and the emergence of the CIO than they have to the legal and organizational paths not taken. This said, historians and others have -- in light of the dramatic decline in labor’s fortunes since the 1950s -- devoted more and more attention to the limits of the New Deal collective bargaining system. While little of it is directly concerned with the issue of metropolitan unionism, this scholarship can help us tease out some preliminary explanations for its failure to survive the reforms of the 1930s or take root in the decades after.

2.1 Labor Relations and Economic Change

Metropolitan unions were, in some respects, simply casualties of economic and demographic change. Metropolitan unionism depended on insulation from competition and succeeded in urban trades and services not subject to external competitive pressures. Through the early twentieth century, many metropolitan unions were undermined by national markets in much the same way that national unions would be undermined by international markets fifty years later. While most of the service unions remained naturally insulated from competition, national markets gradually eclipsed urban markets in industries like baking and brewing and clothing. Unions in these industries declined, or shifted their organizational focus and strategy, as the market widened. The brewing industry, for example, was predominantly local and saloon-based before the onset of Prohibition, and cities such as Milwaukee, St. Louis, and Cincinnati boasted strong, metropolitan brewing locals whose bargaining power rested, in part, on the threat of boycott in a “working class” market. After repeal in 1933, the industry shifted its attention to the national market for bottled beer -- at the expense of the brewing unions. Similarly, national “name brand” markets displaced local production and local unions in printing and baking. The clothing industry was a unique case because locals and leadership of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers (ACW) and International Ladies Garment Workers Unions (ILGWU) managed a rapid and successful transition to the very different organizational premises of the CIO. Before 1935, ACW and ILGWU locals had focused on local competitive conditions; after 1935, they absorbed the logic of the New Deal and turned their attention to the task of promoting consumption.

The eclipse of urban markets was doubly damaging to the “regulatory unions” which had served both workers and employers in locally competitive markets. Leading employers in industries such as clothing and printing had promoted and supported unionization as a means of lifting wages out of competition and disciplining the cutthroat margins of the market. But such
strategies rested on an “all or nothing” logic: if the best scenario (for some employers) was the competitive stability that came with the complete organization of urban markets, the second-best alternative was no union presence whatsoever, and the worst was partial organization and the prospect of paying union wages while others were not. This was clearly the situation, for example, which faced retail clerks, waitresses, and janitors -- and their employers -- as chain stores and chain restaurants and contract cleaning firms established a resolutely anti-union presence through the 1950s and 1960s, eroded the logic of existing multi-employer agreements, and demonstrated the feasibility of non-union operation. In retail, national chains (and later catalog sales) eroded the logic and insularity of local markets. In restaurants, the markets remained local, but were increasingly dominated by national firms.

Alongside such changes in the market, service industries also drifted away from the full-time, vocational patterns of employment which had been promoted by the Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees (HERE) and others. The service economy which filled the vacuum left by deindustrialization increasingly boasted a labor market bifurcated between relatively well-paid, well-educated knowledge workers at one pole, and part-time, low-wage, no-benefit, high-turnover hamburger flippers at the other. In turn, service employment (which has accounted for nearly 90 percent of all job growth since the 1980s) never fit comfortably within the CIO-New Deal model of industrial relations: The very character of “service” work complicates the employment relationship with a third-party (customers, patients). Many service jobs, by title or practice, involve some managerial or supervisory role. Service employment (as a consequence of both turnover and contracting patterns) often entails only cursory contact with employers. And much service employment is highly decentralized, characterized by many small worksites or (in the case of homework) no conventional worksites at all.

Just as jobs no longer resembled the mass-production, blue collar, family wage, model of the 1930s, industrial organization (marked by less vertical integration, and complex patterns of contracting and subcontracting) increasingly blurred the boundaries of the firm and the logic of bargaining contained by it. Indeed, virtually the only industry to maintain some semblance of metropolitan organization through the middle decades of the twentieth century was the construction industry -- which was naturally insulated, in some respects, from both the national markets which undermined metropolitan unionism in manufacturing and the deteriorating labor markets which undermined metropolitan unions in other urban services.

2.2 The New Deal

As demographic and economic change made metropolitan unions increasingly harder to sustain, the “big bang” of New Deal-era labor policy also effectively encouraged sectoral organization at the expense of spatial or occupational organization. This, of course, was the raison d’etre of New Deal collective bargaining policy, which gave CIO activists the legal room they needed to get past both the intransigence of most employers and the parochial craft unionism of the AFL. But, as the subsequent history of the labor movement suggests, this was not a simple and unambiguous victory. In some respects, the National Labor Relations Act amounted to little more than a “counterfeit liberty” which tied labor’s fortunes to the legal and political apparatus of state arbitration and allowed older constraints on collective action to “rule from the grave.” In some respects, the logic of New Deal labor policy reflected the microeconomic and macroeconomic benefits (as perceived by New Dealers and some employers) of labor organizations which might both raise aggregate wages and even out labor costs across industries.
And in some respects, the consolidation of the CIO clearly came at the expense of many experiments in local “community” unionism which reached far beyond the factory gates of the core CIO firms and industries.\textsuperscript{20}

New Deal labor policy was firmly rooted in the belief that federal protection of bargaining rights would simultaneously contribute to economic recovery, stability, and (ultimately) prosperity. The key legislative moment, in this sense, was not the passage of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) in 1935 but the collective bargaining provision (Section 7a) attached to National Recovery Act (NRA) of 1933. The NRA’s principal task was the drafting of industrial “codes of fair competition” which hoped, by establishing enforceable price and production standards, to shake out marginal and cutthroat firms in what was generally considered a mature and stagnant and overproductive economy. Accordingly, the NRA organized both wage and hour standards and bargaining rights around the industrial codes. Wage and hour agreements varied widely by industry, and reflected less a federal interest in workers rights than employers’ interest in competitive regulation. Section 7a bargaining provisions were similarly cut to fit industrial circumstances and needs. For the most part, both the NRA and employers saw the creation of company unions as sufficient compliance. In some industries, Section 7a was used to strengthen established patterns of “regulatory unionism” in which employers relied upon the union to enforce industry-wide agreements. Indeed, until the courts pressed the New Deal to some semblance of consistency, the NRA established discrete labor boards on an as-needed, industry-by-industry basis.\textsuperscript{21}

In short, early New Deal labor policy was less for or about labor than it was a complement to (and occasionally a means of enforcing) efforts to regulate competition. This, in turn, shaped the priorities and strategies of the labor movement. Labor activists seeking to take advantage of the legal opening of 7a generally accepted, or at least worked within, the assumption that labor’s gains depended upon competitive stability. This was especially true for industries such as clothing, in which labor had already taken the lead in efforts to increase productivity and regulate local competition. After 1933, for example, the ACW and ILGWU focused less and less on the organization of local markets, and more and more on the task of raising and regulating wages across the industry. More broadly, the NRA shaped the pace and scope of organization as organizing committees scrambled to use Section 7a (and later the NLRA) to their advantage. In most cases, this meant pushing for national sectoral agreements in order to overcome the fragmented and tenuous character of single-plant or single-firm bargaining. In turn, the NRA did little to facilitate metropolitan agreements. The NRA was neither willing (given its constitutional uncertainty) nor able (given its limited resources) to consistently enforce its codes, and leaned heavily on voluntary compliance or industry-led “code authorities.” As a result, it was ill-equipped to facilitate agreements in local multi-employer industries and actually shoehorned many metropolitan or occupational agreements (such as the fledgling organization of retail clerks) into national, sectoral bargaining.\textsuperscript{23}

By 1935, the NRA was in disarray. Those who counted on it to bring about competitive stability resented the lack of enforcement. Those targeted by the codes resented even gestures at enforcement. Small business and consumers had turned Congressional attention to law’s anti-competitive and inflationary effects. The Supreme Court was poised to declare the entire experiment an unconstitutional invasion of state prerogatives. And the New Deal itself was slowly jettisoning the “stagnationist” premises of competitive regulation for the “consumptionist” premises of labor and welfare policy. This was the atmosphere in which the
Wagner Act was conceived and born. Wagner clarified and entrenched the bargaining rights promised by Section 7a, but it also entrenched the sectoral focus of New Deal labor policy. In this sense, Wagner grafted the consumptionist logic of the Second New Deal to the regulatory logic of the NRA and retained the latter’s insistence that labor’s gains accompany and not threaten business recovery or prosperity. The New Deal encouraged labor to frame all its demands -- for wages, for work-based benefits, for job security -- by industry, and made the satisfaction of those demands conditional upon sectoral stability and (as it was put in the clothing industry) “co-managed microregulation.” In many industries, such as the restaurant trades, the Wagner Act’s focus on worksite-based locals and industry-based pattern bargaining came at the expense of service workers generally and diverse metropolitan and occupational bargaining units.

Just as Wagner confirmed the sectoral premises of NRA labor policy, the political and legal refinement of the Wagner Act after 1935 confirmed its clear preference for a variant of industrial unionism based on a combination of local, worksite-based bargaining and a scattering of peak, sectoral agreements (most famously the 1946 “Treaty of Detroit” in the automobile industry). Wartime agreements (typified by the “Little Steel” formula) secured the gains of established CIO unions and committed them to a regime of tightly-regulated, tripartite, pattern bargaining which would also serve as a template for postwar agreements. The 1947 Taft-Hartley Act both gutted the Wagner Act (especially with its right-to-work and anti-Communist provisions), and further confined its attention and protections to sectoral, shop-floor, bargaining units. Alongside the Landrum-Griffith Act (1959), Taft-Hartley (whose provisions were extended to intrastate service trades in 1955) hit hard at the occupational and metropolitan basis of unions in restaurants, hotels, and similar services by opening closed shops, regulating control over the trades, stripping supervisory personnel from bargaining units, narrowing the definition of “employee,” mandating jointly-run benefit plans, and outlawing practices of local solidarity (such as secondary pickets and boycotts) which had sustained the organization of many local service trades.

2.3 The CIO and the Dilemmas of Industrial Unionism

While New Deal labor policy was assembled in Washington, its most important components were forged in local struggles between 1933 and 1937 and in the CIO’s challenge to the AFL after 1935. It is almost impossible to separate, in other words, the progress of law and policy without looking to the local and national institutions of industrial unionism which forced the New Deal’s hand at critical junctures in the 1930s. The fate of metropolitan unionism, in this respect, was also closely tied to the history and strategy of the CIO. Through its earlier history, the national CIO struggled with two overlapping premises of industrial unionism: the first focused on shop-floor concerns of control and supervision and security; the second focused on sectoral concerns of competitive stability and competitive equality. These concerns were not unrelated; indeed CIO locals routinely found that shop floor issues could only be addressed when both management and labor were assured that wages could be lifted out of competition and that marginal non-union firms would not reap a competitive advantage. But the manner in which the CIO juggled these concerns had enormous implications for the survival and the character of local workers’ movements. Historians have increasingly recognized, and lamented, the ways in which the CIO’s preference for pattern bargaining, reliance on federal regulation, and alliance with the Democratic Party came at the expense of diverse local experiments in general or
community unionism and local labor politics. There is less agreement, however, on the causal elements of this story. This is a debate of more than purely historiographical interest because it revolves around the willingness and ability of the labor movement to accommodate or sustain alternative forms of organization or ways of organizing.

Some have suggested that the CIO simply snuffed out a “community-based, horizontally-bonded culture of struggle” in the process of displacing the AFL, signing up basic industry, and sorting out its own sectarian squabbles. “From the beginning,” as Staughton Lynd charges, the CIO “intended a top-down, so-called responsible unionism that would prevent strikes and control the rank and file.” Others have suggested that the CIO’s pursuit of national bargaining and workplace contractualism was a more or less pure and accurate reflection of workers aspirations. But neither of these accounts fly very far as general explanations for the organizational and political choices made by the CIO and its locals during the formative years of the labor movement.

In part, both offer essentially functional explanations which derive the CIO’s motives in the 1930 and 1940s from the state of the labor movement decades later; one damning national leaders for turning their backs on local efforts, the other praising national leaders for their pragmatic accommodation with management and politics. In part, both exaggerate the choices available to national and local labor leaders under difficult political, economic, and legal conditions; one assuming that the late 1930s was a truly “open” historical moment, the other assuming that labor got what precisely what it wanted. And in part, both views are inattentive to the tremendous variation across localities, regions, and industries. In some instances and in some respects, dynamic metropolitan labor movements were distorted by the CIO’s top-down industrial unionism; in some instances, local movements never floated much more than simple “job-conscious” appeals; and in most instances the emergence of the CIO was marked by a complex pattern of material accommodation and consent. By and large, local union activists saw affiliation with the CIO as a necessary prerequisite to organizational security and wage stability -- especially given the sectoral logic of both the NRA and the NLRA. And while such a choice organized workers’ aspirations and demands around the logic of sectoral bargaining, they did not necessarily force local activists to abandon local political or bargaining initiatives, which often persisted with the CIO’s blessing or despite its indifference.

As to the future of metropolitan unionism, the CIO occasionally discouraged occupational or spatial organizing but -- following the logic of the New Deal -- more routinely neglected such efforts or proved unwilling or unable to accommodate them. The CIO chartered a range of service unions -- including the United Office and Professional Workers (UOPWA), the United Federal Workers, and the State, County, and Municipal Workers (the forerunner of AFSCME) in the late 1930s but, when faced with jurisdictional questions, invariably leaned to sectoral rather than occupational bargaining units. The national office, for example, forced the UOPWA to give up jurisdiction of clerical staff in the rubber and steel industries to the United Rubber Workers and the United Steel Workers respectively, although neither industrial union had made any effort to include white collar workers in contracts. This left the UOPWA with a meager base in banking and insurance, and in “paper factories” (such as press clipping services, direct mail firms, and commercial clearinghouses) which resembled conventional industrial worksites. The urgency with which the CIO herded members into sectoral units (as we shall see below) also reflected the tug-of-war between the CIO and the AFL in the 1930s and 1940s. In this sense, the
CIO was less hostile to community or occupational units than it was anxious (with some cause) that they would be snapped up by the craft-based AFL. In turn, industrial unionism invariably undermined general or community unions not (as some critics have charged) out of hostility to their premises, but because neither the CIO unions nor their locals had the luxury of forgoing immediate security for the vague promise of broader solidarity. After the organizational flurry of the late 1930s, job security (the right to an individual job and its benefits) trumped employment security, and distracted unions from new organizing to matters of contractual or procedural justice. Bargaining over employment-based benefits increasingly undercut the viability of union-sponsored or public alternatives. The drift to sectoral bargaining had important gendered implications: women were more deeply rooted in community politics and the rise of a hierarchical CIO came at the expense of their political engagement -- as workers, as consumers, and as home-owners or tenants. Sometimes unwittingly, sometimes with a clear sense of loss, the CIO transformed a range of historically community concerns (such as health care) into fragments of work-based “breadwinner” entitlements, while leaving other working class issues (such as housing) behind altogether. And over time, a combination of legal constraints, managerial backlash, and bargaining strategy contributed to the evaporation of organized labor’s local political, intellectual, and cultural presence as well.

2.4. Bargaining Dilemmas

In large part, the decline of metropolitan unions reflected labor’s material insecurity and the strategic logic of industrial unionism. Clearly American workers, under extraordinary political and economic and legal constraints, had little choice but to forgo solidarity for security; to pursue its long-term economic and political goals (as best it could) through short-sighted bargaining. Over time, the necessary retreat to “bread and butter” industrial unionism further confined labor’s reach and its grasp. As I’ve suggested above, all of this made it harder to sustain spatial bargaining and more tempting to follow the line of least organizational and political resistance to sectoral bargaining. As importantly, the postwar bargaining model proved ill-equipped to accommodate service workers for whom “bread and butter” issues were often secondary to job conditions, autonomy in their interaction with customer or patients, professional respect and recognition, and a commitment to the quality and integrity of the services they provided (the latter is especially true today, for example, of the response of nursing unions to the spread of Health Maintenance Organizations).

In turn (but much less commonly noted) the limits of the New Deal system of labor relations reflected the organizational disarray of the business community. Employer’s associations have always foundered in the United States, in large part because they have always lacked the organizational scope or clout (vis a vis labor or the state) to negotiate or enter into agreements. Indeed, with the collapse of the famous bilateral monopolies in the late nineteenth century glass, pottery and metal trades, most employers’ associations were “belligerent” associations designed not to engage in collective bargaining but to avoid it at all costs. Through the 1920s and 1930s, employers struggled to maintain metropolitan employers’ associations with the ability and responsibility to enter into agreements. In many cases, it was never clear what the appropriate scope of an employers’ association should be: industries were notoriously hard to define and easy to split, and mimicking union organization proved next to impossible given the jurisdictional disarray and “strange bedfellows” (Teamster nurses, USW dry
cleaners, UE graduate students) typical of the American labor movement. Even when the relative insulation of metropolitan markets (in industries such as building, building services, clothing, and printing) made stable employers’ associations possible, it invariably fell to the unions they bargained with to enforce not only the terms of agreements but the fealty of individual employers.

While workers and some employers appreciated the benefits of organizing a given labor market, employers generally preferred (or at least fell back on) organization of a trade or industry. The disorganization of employers, in this respect, clearly shaped not only their ability to enter into occupational or metropolitan agreements, but the pattern of labor policy and law through the 1930s and beyond. The profusion of trade associations in the 1920s (during which the Commerce Department encouraged associational efforts and promised antitrust relief) proved incapable of addressing either competitive standards or the labor problem. The early New Deal largely accepted the associational logic of sectoral stability and strove (with the NRA) to solve the compliance and “free rider” problems which plagued private trade associations. As we have already seen, the New Deal system never departed from the sectoral assumptions rooted in the NRA and, by extension, the ad hoc pattern of business organization which the NRA reflected. Indeed the NRA both demonstrated the futility of trade associations and, by premising labor policy on industry-specific bargaining and standards, condemned employers to that path of organization. Before and after the 1930s, trade associations set industry against industry and resulted in a profusion of organizations which, rather than rationalizing competition, politicized regional or competitive divisions. Without the standing or inclination to enter into labor agreements, trade associations invariably split on the issue: many local industries (such as construction or printing) boasted competing “open shop” and “closed shop” associations, while stable, representative, negotiatory associations were exceedingly rare.

Such patterns of business organization (and disorganization) reflected labor’s political and economic weakness. Business interests could afford (or get away with) their persistent defense of managerial rights precisely because they did not have to confront labor as a political force. In turn, political weakness and decentralization exaggerated the stakes of private bargaining: American unions, at least for the middle years of this century, were strong enough to organize much of the core mass-production economy but weak enough to fail at taking wages out of competition. In this sense, management confronted not only the competitive uncertainty of uneven unionization but also the fact that, in the absence of strong national federation let alone a “labor party,” all of labor’s demands -- for wages, for benefits, for security -- were made in local bargaining. The circumstances which made labor less of a political threat in the United States, in short, also made it more of a managerial threat. This is the overarching irony of the demise of metropolitan bargaining: it was clearly a consequence of business’ privileged political and economic position, and it just as clearly worked to the disadvantage of all but the marginal employers who thrived on competitive instability.

2.5 Politics

The demise of metropolitan unionism had political causes and political implications as well -- indeed, the CIO’s scholarly critics routinely identify labor’s drift to the Democratic Party and away from local and independent labor politics as a close parallel to its drift from local to national bargaining. Certainly labor’s “barren marriage” with the Democratic Party is an important part of this story -- especially in those instances in which local labor leaders detected a
“faint aroma of futility” in third-party efforts and saw close alliance with the national Democrats as the only means of cementing the gains of the New Deal. There is no need here to revisit the logic and consequences labor’s role in national politics and political culture after the 1930s. It is important, however, to trace their reflections in local labor politics.

Despite early male suffrage and labor’s substantial urban presence, local working class politics have always foundered in the United States. In part, this reflects a pattern of civic “reform” (installing city managers, weak mayors, and non-partisan elections, for example) designed explicitly to discourage class-based coalitions. In part, this reflects the racial and ethnic foundations of early century machine politics, in which ethnic patronage invariably trumped programmatic alliances. And in part, this reflects the persistent efforts of national labor leaders to discourage romantic independence and swing local labor movements behind the Democrats.

Without elaborating on what the relationship between municipal politics and municipal labor movements might have looked like, it is important to note that deference to Democratic machines (or attempts to confront Republican machines) foreclosed any serious pursuit of independent labor politics. For these reasons, urban politics have always been marked by a sharp disjunction between workplace radicalism and electoral politics. In this sense, the material bases of consent -- encompassing both the immediate rewards of political patronage, and the prohibitive costs of political challenges -- have historically driven workers into the arms of urban machine politics and service-oriented party politics.

Metropolitan labor movements were also hurt by the events of the early 1930s. Before 1929, the economic and political role of Central Labor Councils (CLCs) varied widely; some were serious political and economic actors in their communities, some were little more than exclusive fraternities of the local building trades. The onset of the Depression hit most CLCs very hard, in large part because it devastated the building trades which accounted for much of their membership and clout. In turn, the emergence of New Deal labor policy and the CIO immediately embroiled CLCs (which were of course dominated by AFL locals) in political and jurisdictional turmoil. In some settings, such as Chicago, CLCs cooperated with the CIO drive early on, although the national AFL eventually forced them to expel CIO locals. In some settings, such as San Diego, CLCs stuck to the national AFL line and gave little support to the CIO. In some settings, such as Columbus, Ohio, the AFL ultimately expelled entire CLCs which remained openly sympathetic to the cause of industrial unionism. In some settings, such as Milwaukee, CLCs themselves split along craft-industrial lines. While the jurisdictional confrontation played out in a variety of ways, on balance it devastated the political aspirations and economic role of most CLCs. In turn, as sectoral bargaining displaced spatial and occupational forms of bargaining, it also undercut the very logic of local political or economic organizing. Despite the explosion in labor’s ranks, in most settings CLCs were less important at the end of the 1930s than they had been at the tail end of the “open shop” 1920s. After 1945, CLCs forswore any substantive role in local organizing, save occasionally bringing unorganized worksites to the attention of sectoral unions.

The political role of AFL-affiliated CLCs was also shaped by the labor movement’s uneven civil rights record in an era in which the racial composition of American cities was changing rapidly. In most respects, the fact that the working class was divided by race and ethnicity and gender would not be particularly important to the fate of metropolitan unionism, because such divisions made sectoral organizing more challenging as well. But a couple of considerations are important. The metropolitan unions which thrived in the century’s first
decades included very few African-Americans among their members -- indeed both the building trades and many emerging service trades were historically and notoriously racist in their hiring practices. While the CIO’s civil rights record varied widely after 1935, many locals and unions accepted the necessity (and occasionally the principle) of building a racially-inclusive labor movement. In this sense, industrial unions were (however imperfectly) able and willing to accommodate African-American workers in ways that occupational or metropolitan unions (for a variety of reasons) were not. Accordingly, attempts to revive or rebuild urban/occupational unions have had to directly address a history of exclusive hiring practices (as in the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers’ “COMET” initiative) or proceed (as in the Service Employees International Union’s “Justice for Janitors” campaign) as both an organizing drive and a civil rights movement.

In turn, even the CIO’s scattered successes were increasingly constrained by the economic and political crisis of the postwar city. In other words, the health of metropolitan unions rested, in some respects, on the health of the metropolis -- and, by any measure, the nation’s core urban-industrial centers began hemorrhaging jobs, investment, and tax revenues almost immediately after World War II. This played out in increasingly bitter confrontations between white workers and black workers over urban space, urban jobs, and urban politics. In cities like Detroit, the combination of urban decline and sectoral bargaining increasingly eroded the natural solidarities of work and community, and white autoworkers (for example) increasingly reinforced patterns of residential segregation, turned away from community institutions in favor of work-based benefits, resented the meager redistributional premises of the Great Society, and supported conservative candidates for municipal office.

Finally, metropolitan unions and metropolitan labor politics were disproportionately affected by the politics and political culture of the Cold War. The anti-Communist affidavits imposed by Taft-Hartley marginalized many unions and their members, and forced others to make difficult choices. The impact of the post-1947 purge was magnified in local labor politics because community-based efforts -- including the Unemployed Councils of the early 1930s, stabs at cross-sectoral organizing or independent politics, and the early successes of the CIO -- all depended heavily on radical organizers and “militant minorities.” Some of the most dynamic urban service unions -- such as the Transport Workers’ Union in New York City and elsewhere -- were torn apart by the “loyalty” question. And, as I’ve suggested above, Taft-Hartley’s anti-Communism was reflected in its bargaining provisions as well, which made it harder to forge or sustain working class alliances beyond the confines of a given worksite or industry.

3. And the Consequences . . .

In the formative years of the New Deal order, as I’ve suggested above, a system of labor relations and labor policy emerged which both closed off alternatives to simple industrial unionism at the time, and have made such alternatives more difficult to pursue in recent years. The logic and trajectory of New Deal labor policy was quite simple: In the context of the Great Depression, changes in labor law were always part and parcel of larger strategies of economic recovery. Through 1929-1933, many blamed the Depression on the chronic competitive disorganization of basic industry. The New Deal’s first recovery strategy (the NRA), accordingly, was to empower private trade associations to “shake out” marginal and cutthroat competitors; the labor policy which accompanied this was little more than another means to the same end. When the NRA was thrown out by the Supreme Court in 1935, its labor provisions
were recast as the NLRA and the regulatory premises of those labor provisions were expanded to include a broader “demand-side” support for consumption. But the basic assumption that the labor movement would organize by industry and protect its gains by taking wages out of competition remained largely unquestioned. Or at least it remained unquestioned until the late 1960s, when the “politics of growth” was turned inside out (steady gains in a growing economy suddenly turned into concessionary bargaining in a stagnant economy), and the limited utility of the New Deal model in a service economy became glaringly apparent. Despite postwar economic and demographic change, in other words, New Deal assumptions remained encrusted on both the nation’s labor laws and the organization of the labor movement.

The consequences? By conservative estimates, about one-third of the private labor force is explicitly forbidden to organize by archaic, Taylorite, definitions of “employee.” Legal limits on secondary picketing and pre-hire agreements are especially debilitating for service sector workers who have always depended upon the bargaining strength that followed from the close relationship among urban service trades. The narrowly contractual, worksite bargaining units recognized by the National Labor Relations Board press both employers and employees into a mutually unsatisfactory pattern of short-sighted, low-density, decentralized bargaining. Generally, but especially for service sectors, this pattern imposes immense costs on both unions (who must devote considerable resources to basic organizing) and unionized employers (who are likely to continue to face non-union competition). Such costs, of course, could be largely alleviated by metropolitan bargaining or municipal living wage agreements.

The consequences are even more severe if one focuses on particular workers. Service workers, most broadly, were never fully accommodated by either the CIO or the Wagner Act and continue to face -- for all of the reasons noted above -- an inhospitable set of bargaining institutions and assumptions. Women workers, who were always underrepresented by the CIO and (in some respects) left behind by its national consolidation in the late 1930s, also make up the majority of service employees and began claiming a clear majority of new union members just as the movement began to decline. Workers of color and new immigrants, who are disproportionately represented among the poorest paid service trades, are arguably further removed from the benefits of union membership than similarly situated workers of the 1930s and 1940s.

And, of course, the consequences spill beyond the circumstances of particular unions or workers. However one views the viability of the Depression-era experiments in “community unionism,” the political economy of the New Deal-CIO order clearly came at the expense of urban working class politics and contributed to the collapse of labor-liberalism and racial-liberalism in the postwar city. As is more broadly true of electoral and party politics, collective action is stymied at the point where it is perhaps most immediate and most important -- in urban politics and in urban economies.

At first blush, this seems an overwhelmingly dismal story -- the fate of (and prospects for) metropolitan unionism crushed under the weight of economic and demographic change, the terms of labor law and public policy, and the union and managerial strategies forged under these constraints. Yet, as I’ve suggested above, the causal elements of this story are less a series of insurmountable hurdles than they are a single tangle of policies and strategies and assumptions. Relatively modest changes in labor law or union priorities could -- in much the same way that the New Deal made industrial unionism possible despite the entrenched status of craft unionism and
the open shop -- make post-industrial, metropolitan unionism possible despite the entrenched status of industrial unions and “unorganizable” service industries.
NOTES


See Gordon, New Deals, chapter 4; Cobble, Dishing it Out, pp. 70, 92-93, 193-4; Benson, Counter Cultures, p. 269.


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22 Fraser, Labor Will Rule, pp. 259-348.

23 Schatz, The Electrical Workers, pp. 73-76.


26 Fraser, Labor Will Rule, pp. 209, 282-323


29 Cobble, Dishing it Out; Everett Kassalow, “White Collar Unionism in the United States,” in White Collar Trade Unions: Comparative Developments in Industrialized Societies, edited by


34 Roger Horowitz, "What Did Workers Want in the 1930s, Anyway?" Labor History 38 (1997), pp. 169-72; John Borsos, “We Make You this Appeal in the Name of Every Union Man and Woman in Barberton’: Solidarity Unionism in Barberton, Ohio, 1933-41,” in We Are All Leaders, pp. 238-293.


36 Faue, Community Of Suffering and Struggle, pp. 127-128.


45 Gordon, New Deals, pp. 166-203.

46 The New York women’s apparel industry, as one observer noted in 1950, had two competing shoulder pad associations and an “Adjustable Shoulder Strap Association (Carpenter, Employers’ Associations and Collective Bargaining, p. 38); in the 1940s, the Chicago motion picture industry had two competing trade associations (Christenson, “Chicago Service Trades,” pp. 813, 831-832). See also Robert Myers and Joseph Bloch, “Men’s Clothing Industry,” in How Collective Bargaining Works, pp. 381-449; Newell, Chicago and the Labor Movement, pp. 26-29).


