For two generations of Americans, Harry Bridges was the leading voice of the left within organized labor and an important voice of dissent within American society more generally. His career provides many opportunities for studying "the Tradition of Dissent Among Waterfront Workers," today's conference topic. In my paper, I shall first explore some of the meanings Bridges attached to "left-wing unionism" and then look at some aspects of the response of the state to those views. Given time constraints and the state of my own research, I shall concentrate on the first dozen years of Bridges's career.

I.

What did it mean to Harry Bridges to be leader of a left-wing union? Testifying before a Congressional committee, Bridges once offered his definition of a "left-wing union":

It's a union that's willing to arbitrate . . . [This provoked chuckles in the hearing room.] It's also a union that believes in a lot of rank and file democracy and control . . . It's a union that believes that its officers should be easy to remove and . . . [that] their wages and expenses [should be] no more than the . . . highest paid worker that's a member of the union. It's also a union that recognizes that, from time to time, it's got to stand up and fight for . . . civil liberties, racial equality, and things like that. (1)
In his definition, Bridges emphasized "a lot of rank-and-file democracy and control." As president, he claimed that all he ever did "was act as spokesman" (2) for the rank and file. For Bridges, the rank and file also represented his most important source of strength. He once described his relationship to the rank and file as follows:

I had a bunch of guys down below that I represented, and if I made a mistake--and I made plenty--and led with my chin--they'd throw me back in the ring, and say: 'Get back in there, you stupid fool, and duck next time.' I had something going for me that way . . . I knew I could always fall back into their arms. (3)

Thus, Bridges not only drew his strength from the rank and file, but he also gained confidence from the knowledge that they supported him.

The members of the ILWU did support Bridges. Nearly all unions practice a form of plebiscitary democracy, in which officers repeatedly win reelection against little or no opposition. That was, in fact, the case in the ILWU: Bridges was reelected time after time, rarely against opposition. As compared with most other unions at that time, however, there was a major difference: Bridges was always re-elected by the full membership of the ILWU. He had advocated such a policy for the ILA in 1935, before the creation of the ILWU, and direct election was written into the ILWU constitution from the beginning. (4) When he ran for district president in 1936, he won with 75% of the vote, his worst showing. In 1949, facing deportation and expulsion from the CIO, Bridges made his second worst showing, when he won 81% of the vote. (5)

Part of Bridges's definition of a left-wing union specified that "officers should be easy to remove." In 1935, when still part of the ILA, he had unsuccessfully proposed an amendment to permit recall of international officers by 20 percent of the membership. (6) As president of the ILWU, he constantly reminded members--especially his critics--that the ILWU constitution specified that a petition by only 15 percent of the membership could suspend an international officer and force a recall election. (7) This provision was highly unusual if not unique among international unions.

Plebiscitary democracy may be typical of most unions, but the ILWU developed other, more unusual means for members to participate in crucial decisions. The most significant was and is the Longshore Caucus, a meeting of elected delegates from all ILWU waterfront locals who meet for several days to discuss issues facing them, especially contract issues. At the conclusion of the caucus, its recommendations go to each relevant local for discussion and endorsement. At the conclusion of negotiations, the contract is reviewed by the caucus before a vote by the full membership. Caucuses serve as important channels of communication over vital contract issues—in the caucuses, the officers and coast committee hear the concerns of the membership, and members from every local hear the committee explain contract decisions. (8)
Bridges understood the power of symbols for minimizing the distance between leaders and members. One such symbol was his salary. He argued that a union president should not earn more than the highest paid working union member, and he stuck to that commitment throughout his career. In fact, he accepted no more than the best paid *working member* of his local, *even though members of some locals—especially clerks and walking bosses*—could earn more than he did. In 1964, for example, Bridges received just under $17,000—about $14,000 as salary and under $3,000 for expenses. That same year, Joe Curran took in nearly $106,000 from the National Maritime Union, Jimmy Hoffa got more than $91,000 from the Teamsters, George Meany received almost $49,000 from the AFL-CIO, and Mike Quill of the Transport Workers picked up just over $29,000. Of 36 union presidents listed in a news magazine salary survey, none received less than Bridges. (9)

Bridges's lifestyle reflected the same concerns. When he and Nikki bought a home, it was a modest row house in a middle class neighborhood. When he traveled, he often stayed in cheap hotels. When other ILWU international officers were buying Cadillacs through a special price arrangement, Harry kept driving a Ford—although he apparently was sorely tempted—because a Cadillac would deliver the wrong message about being the president of the ILWU. (10) Nothing earned Harry's contempt faster than making a personal profit from the trust of the union members, and he set a high personal standard.

All of these were symbols of an underlying commitment on Harry's part, one that he stated forcefully as early as 1935 when he told a local meeting in San Francisco that "union officials who like their jobs because of the salary attached to it [sic] are not worth anything to the workers." (11)

Another criterion that Bridges specified in his definition of a left-wing union was a willingness to fight for such issues as civil liberties and racial equality. As a union leader, Bridges led many such fights. In the time I have today, I can look briefly only at some of his efforts regarding racial discrimination. (12) In October 1933, Bridges and his group within the San Francisco local addressed racial issues in an article in the *Waterfront Worker*, their mimeographed newsletter; in that article, they argued that building a strong, unified organization required not only recruiting black longshoremen into the union but also integrating longshore work gangs. (13) Pressed by Bridges and his group, the local executive committee appointed a special organizer to work with black longshoremen. According to Thomas Fleming, who was a student and reporter for a black newspaper in 1934, Bridges spent his Sundays at black churches throughout the bay area during the strike, "implored Blacks to join him on the picket line," and promised that, "when the strike was settled, Blacks would work as union members on every dock in the Bay Area and the West Coast." Bridges's own memory, recorded in 1942, is virtually identical: "In 1934, I recall, I went directly to them. I said: 'Our union means a new deal for Negroes. Stick with us and we'll stand for your inclusion in [the] industry.'" (14)
Soon after the strike, when the Bridges group won control in the San Francisco local, they integrated black members into white gangs, and barred the old Jim Crow gangs. (15) Soon after, the ILA also broke through long-standing barriers against recruiting union members of Asian ancestry.

Throughout his career in the ILWU, Bridges advocated full integration of the workforce and the union, and the union repeatedly pronounced itself in favor of "equal treatment for all regardless of race, creed, color or sex." (16) The Dispatcher, the ILWU newspaper, frequently carried articles advocating equality for all workers, and regularly featured stories, often with photographs, about the union activities and workplace contributions of African Americans, Latinos, Asian Americans, and women. (17) In 1945, the paper also presented a long feature article exploring the nature of prejudice as a "roadblock to progress." (18) The ILWU also pointed with pride to blacks and women on its executive board and organizing staff. (19) The Dispatcher carried Bridges's column, "On the Beam," in nearly every issue for 35 years, and Bridges often used his column to advocate racial equality; in 1942, for example, he characterized discrimination against blacks as "unconscionable, cruel and anti-American," and as "anti-labor." (20)

During World War II, a large increase in the number of black longshoremen in Pacific Coast ports produced racial problems in some locals, but Bridges and the other International officers spoke clearly and consistently in favor of full integration. However, their commitment to local autonomy—and perhaps their understanding of political realities—meant that they did not intervene in large and politically powerful locals where there was clear evidence of racial discrimination, notably San Pedro and Portland. (21) In March 1945, the Stockton warehouse unit precipitated a crisis when it refused to admit James Yamamoto, who had been recently released from a relocation camp. Union officers tried to reason with the Stockton members but found them adamant. Committed to racial equality and spurred as well by a political concern for the potential impact of their actions on organizing underway in Hawaii, Bridges joined other officers in going to Stockton, where he personally ripped their charter from the wall and suspended the unit until each member signed a non-discrimination pledge; those who refused were expelled. (22) The Portland longshore local, Local 8, resisted pressures for racial integration until the early 1960s, when the International officers finally forced the local to accept its first black members. (23)

In 1935, Bridges presented an important element for his concept of left-wing unionism: "all unions should support unions on strike." (24) He especially liked to quote Marx's injunction, "Workers of the world, unite." (25) Throughout his years as leader of the ILWU, he sought repeatedly to develop a unified approach to collective bargaining for all maritime unions—or even all transportation unions. In 1935, he helped to create the Maritime Federation of the Pacific, combining all the Pacific Coast maritime unions, (26) only see it founder on the shoals of conflict between the Sailors and the Longshoremen, and between the AFL and CIO. Bridges took the lead in 1946 in forging the Committee
for Maritime Unity, aimed at developing common bargaining among all six CIO maritime unions. In the late 1950s, when James Hoffa called for a Conference on Transportation Unity, Bridges responded favorably; at the same time, the ILWU and the Teamsters worked together to resolve jurisdictional disputes in warehousing and in Hawaii, and they began some joint bargaining. Bridges also tried to bring a common expiration date for east coast and west coast longshore contracts. One of his last public statements was to endorse affiliation with the AFL-CIO when ILWU members voted on that measure in 1988. (27)

In addition to Bridges's commitment to rank-and-file democracy and control, to racial equality, and to labor unity, a centrally important element in his identity as a labor radical came from his outspoken support for and defense of the Communist Party (CP) and the Soviet Union. Bridges himself acknowledged that "all the evidence introduced against me in that fight with the government was 95% true." (28)

A few examples will indicate the nature of his support for the CP and Soviet Union. In 1938, when the Dies Committee charged Bridges with being a party member, he dismissed the charges as "lies," but, at the same time, added fuel to Dies's fire by describing the Communist Party as "friends of the working class and the small business men and farmers." (29) When accused of meeting with known Communists, he always freely acknowledged that he discussed issues with a wide range of people, including Communists.

In his column in the Dispatcher, and in the paper more generally, Bridges made clear his support for the Soviet Union. In May 1943, for example, he devoted his column to refuting charges that the Soviets had murdered 10,000 Polish army officers near Smolensk. In February 1944, when the Soviet constitution was changed to establish sixteen separate republics, Bridges defended the change against criticism from those he described as "chislers, phony politicians and fifth columnists." And in August 1945, the Dispatcher carried a full two-page spread on "How Soviet Trade Unions Work," by Mikhail P. Tarasov, secretary of the All Union Central Council of Trade Unions of the USSR. (30)

For Bridges, the enemies of the CP and the Soviet Union were his enemies too. He attacked red-baiters as "agents of the enemy" and suggested that "it is not the reds, but the red-baiters who ought to be kicked out of our unions." (31) During the World War II, he condemned "Trotskyites" as "the undercover tools of fascism" (32) and lumped them with "Axis Fifth Columnists, . . . anti-labor employers, Norman Thomas socialists, [and] the appeaser press" as the greatest dangers to full mobilization and maximum production. (33) This, in turn, clearly points up some of the limits on his commitment to the unity of labor.
Bridges's views on the CP and the Soviet Union were not unusual among ILWU international officers and staff. Indeed, the pro-Communist views of Bridges and other ILWU officers attracted capable and dedicated staff members who were either CP members or supportive of it. (34) CP officials seem, on occasion, to have tried to intervene in ILWU office matters. One woman told me that, while she was a party member and on the ILWU research staff, a CP official directed her to end her relationship with a man who the party thought was politically unreliable; shortly after she refused, her immediate superior on the ILWU staff told her she could no longer work for the union if she did not end the relationship. When Bridges heard about it, however, he immediately made clear that her job was not dependent upon following CP orders about her personal life. (35)

The public record makes clear that Bridges often followed the party's lead when he commented on foreign and domestic policy issues. (36) Both the government and the CIO charged that Bridges accepted orders from CP officials and that Bridges and the ILWU had unfailingly followed the Communist Party line. (37) There is no reliable evidence for such charges, however, and the evidence that exists suggests a much more complicated relationship: CP officials had easy access to Bridges and they sought to influence him and the ILWU, but Bridges made his own decisions. (38) He put it this way in 1945: "our policies will be made to fit our union and determined by it, and it only. If ... [our opponents] revive the old cry about us taking orders from Moscow, we have no time for even contempt any more--only for a horse laugh." (39) The left perspective of Bridges and other ILWU leaders, for example, led them to seek contract provisions specifying racial nondiscrimination, a position that coincided with the views of the CP. Similarly, Bridges's support for the no-strike pledge and for increased productivity during World War II coincided with the views of the Communist Party. (40) On the other hand, for a contrary example, when the CIO was preparing to expel the ILWU for being Communist dominated and the party sent Al Lannon to San Francisco to urge Bridges not to wait for expulsion but to walk out, Bridges flatly refused, arguing that the ILWU belonged in the CIO and would not leave of its own accord. Again, in 1954 and 1955, the Communist party took the position that the expelled unions should go back into the mainstream labor movement on whatever terms they could gain, but Bridges and the ILWU remained independent. (41)

A central thread that runs through these elements is Bridges's Marxism. He felt his class analysis always kept him grounded in negotiations; no matter how well he got along personally with the men on the other side of the table, he knew that, in bargaining, they represented what he called the "class enemy." He approached race relations from a class analysis, arguing for racial integration of the workforce and the union, and he tried to build class solidarity across the lines of race, ethnicity, gender, and craft. Similarly, he worked from his ideological perspective to define the role of union president and to foster rank-and-file democracy. His ideological perspective led him beyond "pork chops" to
domestic policy issues involving civil rights and civil liberties, and to foreign policy issues as well.

At the same time, however, Bridges’s ideological commitments drew such attacks on him and his union as to drain enormous amounts of time, energy, and resources just for defense. Further, Bridges’s ideological commitments—and those of many other ILWU activists—ultimately led the CIO to expel them. The ILWU lost its eastern locals. They tried to protect the Marine Cooks and Stewards Union—also expelled from the CIO—by taking it under their wing, but lost that jurisdiction too. They did incorporate into the ILWU the West Coast locals of the Fishermen’s Union, another expelled union, and added at least one local from the expelled Mine, Mill, and Smelter Workers. For 38 years—27 of them under Bridges’s leadership—the ILWU stood outside the mainstream of organized labor, and for many years it spent an inordinate amount of its resources on defense.

II.

At this point, I want to turn from considering Bridges’s definition of labor radicalism and to look instead at the response those views elicited from the state. In a recent essay, Ellen W. Schrecker concluded that:

The onslaught against the unions whose members and leaders were in or close to the CP came from all sides. Corporations, other unions, even the Catholic Church—all joined forces to drive Communists out of the labor movement. But it was the federal government that guaranteed the success of the endeavor. It legitimated the efforts of the other groups, bringing public support and the blessings of patriotism to hitherto private efforts. It also brought the power of the modern state to the task. (42)

The experience of Harry Bridges in the 1930s provides a rich and many-layered case study in the development of efforts by the state to eliminate Communists and Communist sympathizers from unions. (43)

The Bridges case began six days after Pacific Coast longshoremen went on strike in 1934, when the San Francisco office of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) received a tip that Bridges "should be investigated." A week later, the Washington head of the INS directed the San Francisco District Director to report on Bridges. A hastily prepared report went to Washington the next day, and was delivered to the President’s office the day after. (44)

The investigations that began in May 1934 lasted until 1955, eventually producing a mountain of documentary material, including contributions from the INS, Department
of Labor, FBI, the White House, and Congress, as well as Bridges's union and his defense attorneys. (45) The archival material on the Bridges case tells many stories—about Bridges, his union, the CIO, the Left, and anti-communist activities on the Pacific Coast in the 1930s. It also provides a window through which to view the functioning of the state in the 1930s.

Until 1940, the INS was under the Labor Department, and it is that part of the Bridges deportation case that I shall examine. Doing so will demonstrate that "the state" during the New Deal contained officials who differed significantly over policy, and agencies that often acted at cross-purposes. Within the federal executive branch, officials and agencies involved in the Bridges case before 1940 included the President, the Cabinet, the Secretary of Labor, the Solicitor of the Department of Labor, and much of the INS, from Commissioner down to scores of inspectors and clerks, some of whom acted with a high degree of autonomy. Congress became deeply involved in the Bridges case through House and the Senate committees that challenged the executive branch. The Bridges case also involved state and local officials throughout the entire Pacific Coast. In addition, various local, state, and federal governmental agencies cooperated with, and sometimes relied upon, a network of non-governmental organizations dedicated to fighting communism.

A good place to begin is with Secretary of Labor Frances Perkins. Upon taking office, she was surprised and distressed to learn that immigration and naturalization matters took up more than two-thirds of the budget and staff of the Labor Department. She was also well aware that, under her predecessors, "the Immigration Service had been used improperly to get rid of certain militant and effective labor people." She resolved that nothing like that would happen in her administration, and she chose Daniel MacCormack to head the INS because of his competence and honesty. Together they worked to change federal deportation policy. (46)

The initial treatment of Harry Bridges by the INS reflected these new policy priorities. Through 1934 and 1935, local INS officials dutifully followed up leads they were given about Bridges, mounted limited investigations of their own, approached the San Francisco police for evidence they might have—and then, periodically, announced that they had uncovered no reliable evidence. None of them seemed eager to deport Bridges; none seemed particularly interested in protecting him. Bridges himself, in August 1934, told the assistant director of the San Francisco INS office that he had lied on his 1928 declaration of intent when he stated he had been married in 1923. This, however, was not used against him. Instead, San Francisco INS officials specified that there was "only one issue"—"whether Bridges is a member of the Communist Party or affiliated" with it. The Washington INS office reported, in August 1935, that, "an exhaustive investigation" had yielded "no evidence . . . to warrant the charges of communism." (47)
As Bridges gained prominence after the 1934 strike, however, the clamor for his deportation increased, including the governors of California and Oregon. (48) Perkins's new approach was now challenged from two directions--from local INS officials, who came under increasing pressure from anti-communist organizations, and from members of Congress, who were also being pressured by anti-communist groups.

As Perkins's approach to deportation became apparent, groups outside the Labor Department began an aggressive, and sometimes unprincipled, search for evidence to justify the deportation of Bridges. One key figure was Harper Knowles, head of anti-radical activities for the California American Legion. Knowles claimed that his organization held a central place among anti-Communist efforts within California, with close working relations with Military and Naval Intelligence, the California Division of Criminal Identification and Investigation, various Pacific Coast police departments, and leading employers' associations. (49)

In late 1935, Knowles began pressuring the INS to undertake legal action against radicals in general and Bridges in particular. When INS officials insisted that reliable evidence was lacking, Knowles presented an affidavit claiming that Bridges had made statements that, Knowles argued, "in themselves . . . justify deportation proceedings." When the Acting Solicitor of the Labor Department found the affidavit inconclusive, Knowles refused to accept that analysis. (50)

Meanwhile, Stanley Doyle, an Oregon lawyer and prominent Legionnaire, received a special agent's commission from the governor of Oregon. Through arrangements made by the governor's office, Doyle began to work closely with Captain John Keegan, chief of detectives for the Portland Police Department, and with the department's "red squad." (51) In Spring 1936, while in San Francisco, Doyle recruited the assistance of Arthur Kent, a Communist party functionary who apparently provided Doyle with blank party membership cards. Kent or Doyle, or perhaps a third party, seems to have forged a party membership card in the name of Harry Dorgan, allegedly the party name of Harry Bridges. In June 1937, when Bridges was in Portland for a meeting of maritime unions, Doyle delivered the forged card to Portland police, claiming that Kent had taken it from Bridges's hotel room. Doyle also worked with Portland police officials in planting a recording device in Bridges's hotel room during that convention. (52)

On June 14, a Portland police officer contacted Roy Norene, the Portland INS director, displayed the forged membership card, and promised testimony against Bridges by two witnesses. Norene later explained that he would have been "derelict in my duty if I did not receive this testimony." (53) By such protests, Norene may have intended to demonstrate to his superiors that he was initially a reluctant participant, but his subsequent behavior suggests otherwise. One witness, Kent, showed up as promised and testified on June 15; the other, Henry Schrimpf, was subpoenaed but refused to testify.
He denounced the INS to the maritime unions' meeting, which promptly demanded that Perkins investigate what it termed INS "collusion with forces hostile to labor." (54)

To investigate, Perkins dispatched Raphael P. Bonham, of the Seattle INS office, who absolved the Portland INS of wrong-doing, and promptly joined in the efforts by Doyle and the Portland police to secure more evidence. (55) Financial and other support for the activities by Doyle and the Portland red squad came from business interests in San Francisco and Oregon, the American Legion, and conservative AFL unions in California and the Northwest. (56)

On September 23, 1937, Bonham requested a warrant for the deportation of Bridges, based on five statements by potential witnesses and the forged membership book. At the same time, Doyle threatened to publish everything if immediate action were not forthcoming from the INS. (57) Perkins sent Gerard Reilly, Solicitor for the Labor Department, to Portland to evaluate the evidence, because, as Reilly stated, "the Department . . . suspected that some of the evidence was manufactured." (58) Reilly reported to Perkins that the witnesses were of "dubious character," and that there was a "complete absence of documentary evidence." He therefore advised her not to issue a warrant without further investigation. (59)

Those who wanted charges brought against Bridges did not share Reilly's critical assessment of the evidence. The governor of Oregon, Charles Martin, claimed that the evidence showed Bridges was a communist and called upon Roosevelt to arrest and deport him. (60) Spurred in part by Doyle's threats to publish, and despite Reilly's analysis of the evidence, the new head of INS, James Houghteling, began to prepare a deportation hearing. When news of these plans reached the press, Bridges insisted to Perkins that no hearing was necessary. (61) Perkins's response, actually drafted by Reilly, included a disclaimer that holding a hearing did not mean that the Department of Labor considered that "the evidence . . . is necessarily trustworthy." (62) At this juncture, Perkins apparently saw a hearing only as a way to clear the air; later she recalled that she "did not believe that Bridges was a Communist." (63)

Powerful members of Congress now joined the chorus urging that Bridges be deported. On January 25, the Senate Committee on Commerce and the Committee on Education and Labor, in joint session, requested that Perkins provide them with the complete file on Bridges. The request cited a pending bill, S. 3078, as justification. Perkins, in response, summarized recent developments in the case and argued that the likelihood of a formal hearing in the near future made it inappropriate to surrender the file, given the need for confidentiality and protection of potential witnesses. The committee chairman, Royal Copeland, promised Perkins confidentiality but insisted on having the file. Copeland then announced that the file proved Bridges was a communist and should be deported. (64) Soon after, Reilly appeared before the committee in closed session and presented his critical analysis of the evidence, but Copeland did not back
When Bridges demanded to appear before the committee to respond to the charges, the Committee voted unanimously not to hear him. (66)

Copeland also introduced a resolution, soon passed, creating a Special Committee to Investigate Conditions in the American Merchant Marine. He signaled the new committee's agenda when he hired Margaret Kerr as clerk, for Kerr had previously worked for the Better America Federation of Los Angeles, a leading West Coast anti-Communist organization that claimed to have evidence that Bridges was a Communist. Copeland continued to seek information regarding Bridges, but when Bridges asked to testify before the committee, Copeland refused. (67)

Repeatedly rebuffed when he sought to respond to the charges against him, Bridges now wired Perkins to request an immediate INS hearing. (68) By then, INS preparations were well underway, but a decision in another case caused the Labor Department to delay the Bridges hearing until an appeal could clarify appropriate grounds for deportation. (69)

The delay in hearing the Bridges case brought a storm of criticism upon Perkins, the Labor Department, and the INS. (70) In August, the House Special Committee on Un-American Activities—the Dies committee—heard testimony from a prominent AFL official, who claimed that Bridges was a Communist and presented the committee with a photostatic copy of the forged membership book. (71) Soon after, a committee investigator charged that Bridges was being advised, instructed, and protected by "an outstanding official" in the Labor Department. (72) From late August through early December, Dies kept the pot boiling by producing additional witnesses, including Keegan. (73)

Bridges denounced the Dies Committee charges as "lies" and as part of a "conspiracy of reactionary employers and A. F. of L. leaders to smash the new labor movement and the New Deal on the Pacific Coast." He argued that the attack on him was motivated by "my respect for, and loyalty to, President Roosevelt and the principles of the New Deal" and was part of efforts to defeat New Deal supporters in the 1938 congressional elections. At the same time, Bridges added fuel to Dies's fire by refusing to denounce the Communist Party or to reject its support, describing party members instead as "friends of the working class and the small business men and farmers." (74)

The Cabinet discussed the Bridges case on January 7, 1939. According to Harold Ickes's diary, Perkins told them that the evidence was unreliable, but James Farley argued that "deportable or not, Bridges ought to be sent out of the country for the sake of the Democratic party." Roosevelt overruled Farley, and "made it clear that Bridges ought not to be deported unless there was legal justification." (75)
Soon after, in the House of Representatives, Parnell Thomas, a conservative Republican from New Jersey, apparently acting on behalf of Dies, moved to impeach Perkins, Reilly, and Houghteling for holding up action against Bridges. Headlines blared the charges, and the House Judiciary Committee held brief hearings. The committee quickly found insufficient evidence to proceed, and the House tabled the Thomas resolution in March. (76)

At about this time, Bridges met privately with Perkins when she was in San Francisco and told her not to hold back on his account and, instead, to save herself politically. He also told Ickes that "he was ready for the hearing and he welcomed it." (77) Bridges's confidence seemed well placed. On March 10, 1939, Reilly reviewed the situation for Perkins and noted that the only evidence that Bridges had so much as mentioned force and violence against the government came from only one deposition, which "even if believed (and it is sure to be contradicted) merely shows prophecy and not advocacy." (78)

A hearing finally began on July 10. By then, Bridges's attorneys knew a good deal about the efforts to secure evidence against him. Someone had provided them with a summary of Reilly's memorandum of October 13, 1937, with its highly critical analysis of the Portland evidence, and an anonymous informant had pointed to some of the funding sources for Keegan's activities. In the hearing, Bridges's attorneys raised serious questions about the credibility of each witness and revealed much of the Doyle-Knowles efforts. The hearing officer, James Landis, dean of the Harvard Law School, found for Bridges. (79)

Bridges, Perkins, and Landis were all unprepared for the storm that the Landis decision generated. (80) Events quickly dashed any hopes that the hearing would end talk of deporting Bridges. On June 13, 1940, the House of Representatives voted 330-42 to direct the Attorney General to arrest and deport Bridges, "notwithstanding any other provision of law." (81) Presidential staff members fretted about the political damage likely to occur from such a measure in an election year, regardless of whether Roosevelt signed or vetoed it. Attorney General Robert Jackson intervened in the Senate to kill the measure. (82) Soon after, the INS was transferred from Labor to Justice, the grounds for deportation were modified, Jackson ordered the FBI to investigate the Bridges case and then ordered a new hearing. (83) This hearing found against Bridges and had to be appealed to the Supreme Court before Bridges could become a citizen in 1945. His citizenship was later challenged in two more court cases, requiring another appeal to the Supreme Court. The last Bridges case was finally dismissed in 1955. (84)

This survey of the Bridges case from 1934 to 1940, as a case study in the role of the state in suppressing labor radicalism, has established that "the state" during the New Deal contained officials who differed significantly over appropriate policy and agencies that acted at cross-purposes. Secretary of Labor Perkins sought to establish a different
policy toward deporting radicals than that of her predecessors, and the initial stages of the Bridges case proceeded under her guidelines. Such efforts, however, were undercut by employer groups, AFL unions, the American Legion, local police red squads, and local INS officials. The evidence they secured, and continuing political agitation by some of the same organized groups, also generated pressures for action in important Senate and House committees. Perkins's efforts to implement her own policy priorities, and to prevent a deportation hearing based on tainted evidence, eventually failed in the face of these political pressures.
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The second section of this paper was given in a different form at the 1994 annual meeting of the American Historical Association.

1. Transcribed from Bridges testimony described as before the Senate Labor Relations Committee [sic], no date, Harry Bridges: A Man and His Union [video documentary, Minott Weihnacht Productions, 1992].

2. [San Francisco] Dispatcher, June 2, 1944, p. 3.


7. For an example of his use of it against his critics, see his response to criticism over his opposition to a third term for Roosevelt in 1940; San Francisco Chronicle, Nov. 5, 1940. He expressed pride in this provision, e.g., to Bill Moyers in 1974; Bill Moyers' Journal, op cit.

8. Similar caucuses have existed for other divisions of the union, too, including Northern California warehouse workers, and Hawaiian sugar and pineapple workers. Such caucuses also exist in a number of other unions.

9. The other union presidents' salaries are in U.S. News and World Report, May 17, 1965, as reported in the Dispatcher, May 14, 1965, p. 5. Bridges did not make the U.S. News list, and his income is based on his tax return for 1964. See also Dispatcher, April 18, 1969, p. 3.


12. Before 1933, only the Tacoma ILA local had admitted blacks as members; see Ron Magden, *Serving Tacoma's Waterfront: One Hundred Years* (Tacoma?: Print Northwest for ILWU Local 23, 1986), pp. 3, 6, 35.


17. For examples, see the columns by J. R. Robertson, *Dispatcher*, Feb. 26, 1943, p. 12, and Aug. 27, 1943, p. 8, and the photo feature relating to strike support, Nov. 15, 1946, p. 9; for a different approach, see the story entitled "He Saved Lives," *Dispatcher*, March 26, 1943, p. 8. The *Dispatcher* began publication in 1942; these generalizations are valid for the years 1942-46, the period covered by this paper.

18. *Dispatcher*, Sept. 21, 1945, pp. 8-9; the section was reprinted from the Army's orientation course on prejudice, as reprinted by the International Labor Defense.


25. For examples, see Dispatcher, June 18, 1943, p. 3.


31. Dispatcher, April 7, 1944, p. 5.

32. Dispatcher, Feb. 8, 1946, p. 2. See also, e.g., Dispatcher, Aug. 11, 1944, p. 2; Aug. 25, 1944, p. 2; March 9, 1945, p. 5.

33. Dispatcher, Feb. 12, 1943, p. 5.


35. Bielawsky interview.

36. This includes a defense even of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact; for a later defense of this action, see Dispatcher, Sept. 22, 1944, p. 2, which notes the charge but responds by an analogy that largely fails to address the question.

37. This was, of course, the basic argument made both by the CIO in its hearing on the expulsion of the ILWU for being "Communist-dominated" and by the government in the various hearings and trials aimed at deporting Bridges.
38. Cf. the following evaluation by one of Bridges's most dogged opponents, Paul Jacobs: "The relationship between Harry Bridges and the Communist party was not one in which the party gave orders and Bridges mechanically obeyed. Rather, the party generally found it necessary to 'handle' Bridges, sometimes wheedling, sometimes cajoling, always feeding his ego. The arrangement between Bridges and the party was something undreamed of in the government's philosophy, a quid pro quo working alliance. Bridges had party members to help him organize, build, and control the ILWU; the party, with Bridges as CIO regional director, was in an excellent position to control state and local CIO councils. Bridges gave the front organizations a kind of status they would not otherwise have had. It has been a handy setup on both sides." See Jacobs, "The Due Processing of Harry Bridges," Reporter (March 8, 1956), p. 36, and a virtually identical passage in his The State of the Unions (New York, 1963), p. 95. Jacobs's views are echoed by Bert Cochran, Labor and Communism: The Conflict that Shaped American Unions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), p. 89n, and Joseph R. Starobin, American Communism in Crisis, 1943-1957 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1972), p. 258, n51.


42. Schrecker, "McCarthyism and the Labor Movement: The Role of the State," The CIO's Left-Lead Unions, pp. 139-158, esp. 139. Schrecker's comments refer especially to the 1940s and 1950s.

44. Telegram, MacCormack to District Director, Immigration and Naturalization Service, May 22, 1934; file No. 12020/25037, Bridges, Harry Renton, City Office file [2], Bridges INS files; W.E. Walsh for Edwin L. Haff to INS Washington, May 23, 1934, file No. 12020/25037, Bridges, Harry Renton, City Office File [2/2], box 14, Bridges INS files; a copy is in General Records of the Department of Labor, Office of the Secretary, RG 174, Secretary Frances Perkins, General Files 1933-41, box 42, folder Conciliation--Strikes--Longshoremen, National Archives (hereinafter Perkins Papers, National Archives); confidential letter, Turner W. Battle to Marvin H. McIntyre, May 24, 1934, Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers, Official File 407b, box 11, folder 1934: Pacific Coast Longshoremen's Strike, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library (hereinafter FDR Papers). Battle's letter derived directly from Haff's report.

45. Since the appearance of the last major scholarly treatment of this case, by Stanley Kutler, in 1982, several important collections of papers have become available to researchers, especially the papers of Richard Gladstein and Norman Leonard, members of the law firm that defended Bridge; the Gladstein papers are at the Southern California Library for Social Studies and Research, Los Angeles, and the Leonard papers are at the Labor Archives and Research Center, San Francisco State University. Important materials from the files of anti-communist groups are in the Surveillance Papers, Meiklejohn Institute for Civil Liberties, Berkeley, which apparently came from the files of Harper Knowles, head of the California American Legion's Radical Research Committee. Other important sources not cited by previous researchers are in the Frances Perkins Papers at Columbia University and the files of several Senate and House committees in the National Archives.


47. See, e.g., memorandum to the Secretary of Labor from Charles Wyzanski, July 17, 1934, Perkins Papers, Columbia University, box 41, folder: Wyzanski, Charles, June 15-July 26, 1934; Thomas V. Donoghue to District Director, February 2, 1935, and telegram
from "Brown," February 2, 1935, and letter, Thomas V. Donoghue to District Director, same date, all in Bridges INS files, b. 18, f. 19030/1-1, Bridges, Harry—S.F. Arrival file 1a134: memorandum for the File of Harry Bridges, by Paul Armstrong, Assistant District Director, INS, 8/20/34 and 8/22/34, Bridges INS files, b. 17, f. Bridges, Harry Renton, Naturalization Div. File 1a131 [1/2]; in re: Harry Renton Bridges, File No. 55874/896, Perkins Papers, Columbia, box 79, folder "Bridges Case/Misc. Documents."

48. Frank E. Merriam, Governor of California, to Frances Perkins, July 18, 1934, Frances Perkins Collection, Microfilm PS 0472, reel 10, Columbia University (hereinafter Perkins Collection, Columbia); Merriam to the President, July 18, 1934, FDR Papers, OF 407b, box 11, folder 1934--Pacific Coast Longshoremen's Strike; San Francisco Chronicle, October 9, 1937.


50. Telegram to San Francisco INS District Director from Washington INS office, January 7, 1936, in Bridges INS files, b. 14, f. No. 12020/25037, l Bridges, Harry Renton, City Office file [1/2]; Knowles to Armstrong, May 4, 1936, Bridges INS files, b. 17, f. Bridges, Harry Renton—Naturalization Div. File 1a131 [1/2]; Knowles to MacCormack, June 20, 1936, ibid.; memorandum for the Commission of Immigration and Naturalization by W. W. Brown, Thomas S. Finucane, and Joseph Savoretti, Surveillance Papers, Meiklejohn Library, series 1, box 3, folder 6. Copies can also be found in a number of other collections, including the Perkins Papers and the Bridges INS files.

51. For Doyle, see Surveillance Papers, Meiklejohn Institute for Civil Liberties, Berkeley, series 1, box 3; for indication that Doyle worked without pay, see Doyle to Wallace Wharton, executive secretary to the governor, January 24, 1938, in ibid., folder 5; see also Doyle to Wallace Wharton, executive secretary to the governor of Oregon, October 1, 1937, Surveillance Papers, s.1, b. 3, f. 5. For the Portland police, see National


54. Bridges's INS files, b. 17, f. 12020/25037, Harry R. Bridges--Transcripts of Statements taken in Seattle District; subpoena, June 15, 1937, Bridges INS files, b. 9, f. 5051-327; Portland Oregonian, June 17, 1937, p. 1; San Francisco Chronicle, June 17, 1937.


56. Reilly to The Secretary, December 20, 1938, Perkins Papers, Columbia, box 38, folder "Reilly, Gerard D., Dec. 6-20, 1938." Doyle was rumored to have worked for an employers' association; see Reilly to Houghteling, October 6, 1937, Perkins Papers, Columbia, box 38, folder "Reilly, Gerard D., Oct. 1-Oct. 13, 1937." See also Reilly to the Secretary, October 13, 1937, Perkins Papers, Columbia, box 38, folder "Reilly, Gerard D., Oct. 1-Oct. 13, 1937." The file regarding Doyle's appointment was removed from the files of Special Agents' Commissions (file D-G, Special Agents' Commissions, carton 39,
Governor Record Group, RGG4, Accession 57-98/1, Oregon State Archives), to be sent to Henry Fowler, of the La Follette Committee, and was apparently never returned. Unfortunately, the National Archives files on the La Follette Committee's California investigations consist only of scrapbooks of newspaper clippings.

Regarding funding, see Doyle's reports of September 26, 1937, October 1, 1937, October 17, 1937, November 24, 1937, February 20, 1938, and February 28, 1938, Surveillance Papers, series 1, box 3, folder 5; James Stewart, affidavit, June 6, 1950, Bancroft Library; Statement of Ivan Francis Cox, op cit.; Reilly to The Secretary, October 13, 1937, Perkins Papers, Columbia, box 38, folder "Reilly, Gerard D., Oct. 1-13, 1937."


58. Reilly to The Secretary, October 4, 1937, Perkins Papers, Columbia, box 38, folder "Reilly, Gerard D., Oct. 1-13, 1937."


62. Quoted in 75th Cong., 2d Sess., House of Representatives, Subcommittee of the Special Committee to Investigate Un-American Activities, Nov. 4, 1938, p. 2082. A copy of it, indicating that it was dictated by "GDR"—Gerard D. Reilly—is in the Dies Committee files, box 626-70. Neither the Perkins Papers, Columbia, nor the Perkins Papers, National Archives, nor the Bridges correspondence files in the ILWU Library, San Francisco, include a copy of this letter.


64. Roger Williamson to Perkins, January 25, 1938, Perkins Papers, Columbia University, microfilm reel #14; copy in Copeland Committee files, b. 1, f. Harry Bridges

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67. History of the Special Senate Committee to Investigate Labor Conditions in the American Merchant Marine, Copeland Committee files, b. 2, f. Committee (Special), History of.

68. Telegram to Lee Pressman, Feb. 11, 1938, Gladstein Papers, box 19, folder 1.


73. San Francisco Chronicle, Aug. 31, 1938. In November, Dies accused Perkins of misrepresenting both facts and law; see 75th Cong., 2d Sess., House of Representatives, Special Committee on Un-American Activities, Public Hearings, Nov. 4, 1938, pp. 2075-2083, esp. 2081. Dies kept up the pressure by calling Keegan as a witness in early December, and Keegan presented some of the affidavits as well as one of the witnesses, James Ferguson, in person; ibid., Dec. 7, 1938, pp. 2909-2919.


77. Interview with Harry Bridges, January 20, 1988; Ickes Diaries, reel 3, p. 3444.

78. Reilly to The Secretary, March 10, 1939, Perkins Papers, Columbia, box 38, folder "Reilly, Gerard D., Feb.-Apr. 1939."

79. Ward, Bridges on Trial, provides the most dramatic account of the proceedings. San Francisco newspapers carried daily coverage. Larrowe, Bridges, summarizes the hearing on pp. 151-216.

80. Landis, especially, was deluged by hate mail; see James M. Landis Papers, Harvard Law Library, box 5, folders 2-6.

81. H.R. 9766 (Allen, Louisiana), 77th Cong., 1st Sess.; for the floor debate and vote, see Congressional Record--House, June 13, 1940, pp. 12380-12407.

82. Memorandum for the President from James H. Rowe, Jr., August 13, 1940, with notation by Roosevelt dated 8/15/1940, FDR Papers, OF1750.


84. Kutler, American Inquisition, pp. 135-149.