Nearly 150 years ago, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels wrote famously, "Workers of the World, Unite! You have nothing to lose but your chains!" The occasion was the wave of revolutionary movements that swept through Europe around 1848 in the wake of widespread economic crisis. Marx and Engels coined their slogan as part of the Manifesto they wrote for the newly created (but short-lived) international league of communists. As they wrote, "Communists of various nationalities have assembled in London, and sketched the following manifesto to be published in the English, French, German, Italian, Flemish, and Danish languages." Both the economic crisis and the revolutionary response had strongly international dimensions.

But Marx and Engels were wrong to think that workers of the world had nothing to lose but their chains, and also that most would agree to place membership in the workers of the world ahead of membership in their individual nations, religions, and other cultural or ethnic groupings. The 1848 revolutions, in fact, were the second wave of revolutions in which issues of economic rights, national autonomy, and the creation of participatory (not always properly democratic) political processes mingled. The first had come in the late 18th century, with the American and French Revolutions as its high points. It is worth pausing to emphasize that in each case these were international waves, and that the revolutions themselves had an international—as well as a nationalist—character. In 1776 and 1789, this can be symbolized by Tom Paine—the great English
revolutionary democrat who wrote his “Defense of the Rights of Man” in the context of the American Revolution and who went on to be elected to the National Assembly of Revolutionary France. There were others too, like Lafayette and Du Pont. In 1848 workers throughout Europe and in America lionized the struggles of Poles for national independence, making the name Kosciuski briefly almost a household word. German tailors living in London sent money to help not only the Frankfurt Parliament but the French National Assembly. And after the German rebellion was crushed, the United States experienced its first large immigration of Germans--the famous ‘48ers (though they have not been celebrated with a football team like the miners of the California Gold Rush--whose numbers in 1849 and the early 1850s included a number of Europeans fleeing the repression that followed the attempt to establish more democratic governments.

So Marx and Engels were not the only internationalists of the mid-19th century. But our very word “international” suggests not the absence of nations but their primacy. Marx and Engels both grasped something important about nationalism and greatly underestimated its importance. What they grasped was the ease with which ideas of national loyalty could be manipulated by elites to get working men and women to stop fighting for their rights and economic interests within their countries in order to focus on foreign threats. But they revealed little sense of the extent to which during the first World War working people would be willing to die for even extremely ambiguous “national interests,” and national interests defined mainly in terms of the corporations

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1 Craig Calhoun is Chair of the Department of Sociology and Director of the Center for Applied Social Science at New York University. This paper originated as a lecture in honor of Harry Bridges to the ILWU
and colonial ventures of economic elites. Equally they failed to anticipate that after
communist revolutions, regimes like that of Stalin’s Russia might form which not only
would fail to establish the classless society, and turn the would-be worker’s paradise into
a hell of political repression for many, but which also would pursue great-power politics
on the foundations of old empires, at once denying national autonomy to those within the
borders of the Soviet Union and abandoning the vision of internationalism in favor of the
interests of the Soviet state.

Above all, Marx and Engels failed to consider that few people would respond to
the real material challenges of global capitalist economic integration simply as workers.
In all cases, other identities were also at work. Workers suffered economic privations as
heads of households, as members of communities, as religious people, as citizens—not
just as workers. It was a challenge for labor activists to get working people consistently
to treat their identities as workers as primary, and it was a challenge that the labor
movement met with only ambiguous success. Indeed, even when they thought of
themselves as members of the working class, most workers continued to think of
themselves first as members of their particular craft or occupation—as printmakers, or silk
weavers, or clockmakers, or longshoremen—not simply as workers. This was especially
true of skilled and relatively privileged workers who might have been best placed to lead
broader working class mobilization, but who chose as often to defend their positions
against the less skilled, the more recent immigrants, and simply those not already in the
union. Marx and Engels did not give adequate recognition to the fact that these other
identities—community, craft, religion, nation—not only existed but could shape the way

and the Labor Studies Program of the University of Washington, June 20, 1996.
people responded to global capitalism. They were not unique in this; most of their more academic cousins in the social sciences made the same error, and both academics and politicians and journalists today continue too often to think that issues like global economic integration are somehow separate from issues like nationalist insurgency and religious fundamentalism. But they are not, and during the rest of this lecture I want to explore some of the linkages and their implications.

Capitalism has brought relentless expansion of global trade. Over time, this has increasingly included a global organization of production. Complex consumer goods like cars and computers are produced by bringing together parts manufactured around the world. These parts may be manufactured by independent suppliers, but full independence is rare. Not only are small producers generally at the mercy of large customers. Much of what appears in economic statistics as international trade is in fact exchange among different branches of a single company operating in multiple countries. Indeed, such “intra-firm” trade appears to account for 40% of all international trade. Different components are produced where skills, technology, political security, labor costs and (perhaps to a dwindling extent) simple tradition dictate.

The extent of such globalization has been increasing very rapidly of late, and this has led some commentators misleadingly to present it as an altogether new phenomenon, perhaps marking the end of the nation-state and possibly also the end of the labor movement and social democratic politics. The extent of cross-state organization of

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production (as distinct from trade in finished goods) is indeed new. But this is not a
departure from two more basic underlying trends: increase in long-distance trade, and
increase in the scale on which production is organized. Both of these underlying trends
have seen a secular rise throughout the modern era. For some two to three hundred years,
however, much of that rise was coupled to the rise of the nation-state. Trade beyond
national borders was largely trade in raw materials or finished products. But the
organization of production (and of capital accumulation) was increasingly escaping the
bounds of the local community and beginning to be organized at a national level.

There have been long-distance markets for millenia. They knit the Mediterranean
basin together in ancient times; the joined medieval Europe; they were basic to the
Islamic-centered world-system of the first half of the present millennium; and they were
behind the rise of the great merchant houses and banking families of the early modern
era. In some settings, from China to Spain, empires attempted to keep the bulk of
economic organization under a single political regime. As Immanuel Wallerstein has
remarked, however, one of the distinctive features of modern capitalism was the
organization of a world system of states each much smaller than the market arena in
which it wished to operate.\textsuperscript{3} Adam Smith’s famous account of the division of labor in
\textit{The Wealth of Nations} was not just about the local manufacture of pins, but about the way
in which nations could function as productive units, not mere trading units. This meant,
of course, that the autonomy of local communities within those nations was challenged.
Many of the labor struggles of the late 18th and 19th centuries actually reflected this
process of national-level integration of capitalism. They were struggles of workers who
saw themselves threatened by a reorganization of capitalism in which financial markets and industrial power were joined on a national level. This removed owners from the local scene, and removed much of the leverage which workers had enjoyed when their work was locally structured. This is one reason why workers often exempted small, locally owned businesses from their strikes, machine-breaking and other collective actions. They were resisting not just capitalism in general or technology in general, but an expanding scale of organization of production. Workers have played an unsuccessful game of catch-up throughout the modern era as capital became efficiently organized on ever-larger scales. Workers pre-existing forms of solidarity—such as craft guilds and local communities—were crucial bases for collective action but were inherently of smaller scale than the national organization of capital they faced. Workers face something of the same problem today, with national organizations of varying levels of effectiveness but extremely weak international organization.

In such circumstances, it is especially likely that workers will attempt to mobilize the political identities that do give them strength. In this sense, there is nothing inherently primary about the identity ‘worker’ as against that of community member, master craftsman, or citizen. To a large extent, 19th century workers organized on the basis of groupings of skilled craftsmen—tailors, weavers, coachmakers, watchmakers, etc.—and members of local communities. Capitalists faced, thus, not workers in general but the Bolton weavers or the glass cutters of Pittsburgh. Transportation workers and

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4 Some of this is evident in Thompson's great The Making of the English Working Class (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968). I have tried to bring it out more clearly in The Question of Class Struggle (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982).
others were important in providing support and linkages where they could, but the primary bases of organization were local. To build national unions was the next crucial step in achieving organizational strength adequate for dealing with nationally organized capital (though local community never stopped being important, even if it was not always well-recognized). The Port of Seattle never faced exactly the same issues as the Port of Los Angeles—let alone that of New York, and the East-West differentiation of longshoremen’s unions is just one of many testimonies to the difficulties of achieving national solidarity in a highly diverse country. Even as workers pursued such solidarity, however, internationalization of capital was proceeding, setting the stage for the next phase of the catch-up game.

The capitalist world system has been a world system of nation-states—or more precisely, states organized at least ideologically largely on the principle of administering the affairs of a single “people” and representing that people in international affairs. A few states are explicitly multinational—like Great Britain and Switzerland—but even they have tended to become (or at least to see themselves as) new units of primary identity, relegating subordinate nationalities to the status of something more like regionally concentrated ethnic groups. However much the notion of singular and unified national identity is an illusion, and comes at the expense of recognition of intra-state diversity, it is one of the governing illusions of the epoch.

Global capitalism is still capitalism, and its operations are guided by the pursuit of profit and capital accumulation. Workers still suffer exploitation, and workers are still generally weaker than capitalist enterprises. But workers are also citizens in nearly all the developed countries of the world and most others, though the extent of rights this brings
them varies. And workers understand themselves as nationals even where they are not citizens, a fact that working-class solidarity has almost never surmounted in sustained ways. Faced with economic challenges, workers have the choice of responding as workers or as nationals. In some countries, like the United States, this means asking whether to blame corporations or foreigners. In other countries, the dominant corporate exploiters are themselves often foreign, placing the identity ‘national’ less at odds with the identity ‘worker’. In every case, there is politics to the question of which identity should be most salient: worker in general, worker in a particular occupation, national, citizen, man or woman. Unfortunately, our theoretical frameworks and practical political understandings have prepared us poorly for this.

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In the middle of the 19th century, it was perhaps excusable to see problems of national identity and religion as likely to fall aside in the face of capitalist economic globalization. After all, one could argue, the economic changes were new enough that their impacts could only be guessed in most cases. And just as the growth of capitalism had contributed to the integration and homogenization of European states, it might eventually create a single global market before which merely national political action would be impotent, and within which people might confront each other simply as workers and capitalists, rather than as Muslims or Frenchmen.  

By the time of World War I, it was obvious that this was not the case—or if it might be true of some future, that future was very distant indeed. The war started, let us recall, with the assassination of the Austrian Archduke Ferdinand in Sarajevo, that city famous today as a symbol of ethnic nationalist strife. But let us be a little clearer what
was going on. The assassin was a Serb, a member of a secret society who had come to Bosnia for the purpose, not a local. While Serbian and Croatian nationalism had been increasingly conflictual for several decades preceding the assassination, Bosnia-Herzegovina had been precisely a peaceful enclave of multicultural cooperation. It had only relatively recently been brought into the Austro-Hungarian fold, after centuries as part of the Ottoman Empire. Though ruled by Anatolian Muslims, this empire had been significantly multicultural and tolerant. When the Christian rulers of Spain, Ferdinand and Isabella, expelled all Jews in 1492, it was primarily into the Ottoman empire that they fled. Many settled in Bosnia, where they lived mainly in peace with their Muslim, Catholic, and Orthodox neighbors for five hundred years. The Jewish community, ironically, was one of the casualties of the fighting of the 1990s; caught amid the violence perceived as primarily Christian vs. Muslim, its leaders finally opted for an organized removal of most of the remaining Jews the symbols of their religion in 1992.

For five hundred years prior to the 1990s, Sarajevo had not experienced any fighting severe enough to damage a building. Not even, as it happens, when that your Serbian nationalist assassinated Archduke Ferdinand. The famous bridge at Mostar, Stari Most, was built in 1566 by the great Ottoman leader Suleyman the Magnificent—who enjoyed the services of a Bosnian Grand Vizier named Vukovich (not exactly our stereotype of the name or ethnic stock of a Muslim leader, whom in Walt Disney fashion we are more apt to stereotype on the image of the evil Jafaar). The very beautiful bridge (which I had the pleasure of crossing more than once before its destruction by Croatian shells in 1993) linked different ethnic quarters of the city, and eventually, churches could be found standing besides mosques. The members of the different ethno-religious groups
did not simply melt into one another, they retained their distinctiveness, but lived in peace. They competed, indeed, in an annual diving competition in which young Muslim, Croat, and Serbian men plunged from Suleyman's bridge into the Most--a ritual at once ethnically divided and mutually engaging, a far cry from ethnic cleansing.

Prior to its fifteenth century incorporation into the Ottoman empire, Bosnia had indeed been part of the contested frontier between Christian Europe and the expanding reach of Islam and Ottoman rule. Some of the fighting of the 1990s was shaped by that heritage. But it is important to note that this fighting was not continuous and consistent. Not only had there been five hundred years of relative peace, the highly localized fighting of the 1990s was different from the clashes of empires five hundred years earlier. It was indeed aggravated by some of the defensive maneuvers taken by the Austro-Hungarian empire. The empire had relocated entire Serb villages into what had long been Croatian territory--precisely to take advantage of the Serbs famous fierceness as bulwarks against possible Ottoman aggression. This started a tendency which was continued in Tito's Yugoslavia when the borders of republics were drawn in ways that did not precisely reflect national or ethnic lines--so that interdependence would be greater and secession harder.

The carving up of the former Austro-Hungarian empire into putative nation-states reflected an ideology that denied the multicultural reality of every country and every city in the region, and asserted that national cultures historically were and should again be homogenous and rooted in compact territories. There was an essence of Serbian identity, in other words, and one right place for Serbian people to live essential Serb lives. Such reasoning helped to issue in a collection of states conceived of as representing different
national groups although none of them was domestically homogenous in ethnic, linguistic or other terms. Any nationality that would truly unify the citizens of any of these states would have to be made, not simply found. But it is also true that except in temporary panics and pogroms the essentialist notion of nationality—the notion that clear and necessary criteria for inclusion can be found which are shared among all members and no non-members of the nation—was never as operative on the ground, in the making of everyday life decisions, as in the discourse of state-building and legitimacy-seeking elites. This is why intermarriage rates between different supposedly national groups could remain quite high (so high that as many as 16% of the citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina were children of "mixed" marriages at the time fighting broke out in 1992).

Yugoslavia is sometimes conceived less as a federation that worked—which, after all, it did at least to a considerable extent—than as the lid placed on a pressure-cooker of ethnic discontent. The lifting of the lid, it is imagined, simply released forced of religious and nationalist fury that had been simmering for ages. This image, unfortunately, informed the very limited thinking of the U.S. Secretary of State, Warren Christopher. In his first speech on the Bosnia war after taking office, Christopher averred that this was simply a matter of “ancient ethnic hatreds” and there was nothing the U.S. or the West could do except to ameliorate the suffering through agencies like the Red Cross.

But Christopher was wrong. He was wrong on the facts, failing to notice Bosnia’s long history of peace. He was wrong in failing to see Yugoslavia as a not completely unsuccessful effort to extend that peace to a wider region. He was wrong to suggest that there was nothing outsiders could do—at a time when the struggles were already being manipulated by outsiders and when the U.S. was supporting a discriminatory arms
embargo (which, as we all know, finally ended when we decided to turn a blind eye as Iran began to ship arms through Croatia, thus stiffening the Bosnian forces enough to bring the Serbs to the negotiating table and stop the fighting). While Tito's Yugoslavia was not all bad, it had helped to create a patchwork quilt of ethnic enclaves by drawing boundaries in such a way that the various republics of its federation would not coincide precisely with ethnic territories. In other words, it had made sure that some Serbs lived in Croatia, and vice-versa, seeing in this a way to reduce the urge to secede or to play purely ethnic politics within the federation. The post-1992 attempt to make the boundaries of the breakaway states coincide with ethnic identities is what produced much of the fighting and human misery. There was an ambition for a greater Serbian, of course, which included seizing neighboring lands. This was manipulated by communist leaders like Radovan Milosevic using nationalism as a new ideology to justify their own continuing power. The tactics of Serbian ethnic cleansing were horribly appalling. But the goal was not totally different from much nationalism throughout the world—the attempt to control a territory within which people were of a single ethnicity, spoke a single language, shared a single religion.

What does this have to do with contemporary global economic integration? Quite a lot, as it happens. First of all, note that contrary to Secretary Christopher's assertion that the sources of the conflict were merely ancient ethnic hatreds (a congenial assertion for him because it justified inaction which was the easiest course for him to take, at least in the short run) the conflict combined some rather old history with some very new

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features. Take the distinction between Serb and Croat. Now seen as an ethnic-national
distinction, this is mainly a difference of religion between people who initially shared the
same language and ethnic stock. Serbs became Eastern Orthodox under the influence of
Russia, while Croats were Catholics with stronger links to the West. It was only in the
19th century that Serb and Croat intellectuals began to try to distinguish their languages
by developing new dictionaries, new standards for correct pronunciation, and new literary
styles. They did this precisely as part of the international wave of nationalism to which I
alluded above—a wave which also brought the revitalization (if not outright reinvention)
of Catalan, Gaelic, and other relatively small languages linked to separatist political
ambitions elsewhere in Europe.

They also did this precisely within the context of the growing crisis of the Austro-
Hungarian empire and the broad realignment of geopolitical forces that brought to the
fore not only a system of integrated nation-states, but modern global capitalism. The
combination is what set the stage for the first world war. On the one hand, capitalism had
brought more and more inter-state trade. On the other hand, the process of capital
accumulation—of taking profits—was organized on a national basis. European states not
only traded extensively with each other and throughout the world, they had drawn much
of that world directly under their control through colonization. Yet internal European
power relations were unstable. Domestically the years leading up to the first world war
were rife with labor strife, socialist agitation, and growing nationalist militancy.
Internationally, the relatively stable and longer-established nation-states of the West—
Britain and France especially—sought to maintain both stability and international power
in the face of the efforts of Central and Eastern Europeans (including Russians) to form
modern states. From a distance, the Russian empire looked much more stable than the
Austrian, and West Europeans turned to Moscow for an ally against Europe's
disintegrating center. As an Austrian labor leader remarked, "The International of the
East dominated by Russia is allied with the British and French International of the West
in order to deny to the middle European, middle Asiatic International access to the rest of
the world and a future share in ruling the world."6

The international catch, of course, was that it wasn't clear where the proper
boundaries of these developing states lay. Nationalism was quickly replacing dynastic
claims as a basis for legitimacy. But as we have seen repeatedly and traumatically
throughout the 20th century, national identity is less the pre-established answer to
questions of political legitimacy than the rhetoric in which competing answers are
debated (with guns as well as words). Claims to German identity, for example, could be
narrower than the bounds of today's newly enlarged German state, or broad enough to
include Austria and parts of Poland—not to mention Germans living as far afield as
Russia and the United States.

The eventual creation of a Yugoslav state was an attempt to impose one unifying
vision on the South Slavs, who indeed had long toyed with unity as a way to secure
independence from Austria. It had the attraction also of securing a modicum of
independence from the Russian-dominated Soviet-Union. Yugoslavia—recall—was the
least loyal of the East European states in its sphere of influence. Yugoslavia also
performed better in economic terms than most communist states (and was more liberal

politically, and more respectful of workers' rights). But it was internally rent on economic as well as ethnic and religious lines. Slovenia and Croatia were more developed economically and more integrated with the capitalist West. In addition to tourism, the traded farm goods, crafts, and some relatively small-scale manufactured goods with Italy, Austria, and Germany. Serbia, by contrast, was the most Soviet-style of the republics that made up Yugoslavia. Its economic emphasis was much more on heavy industry, and much more of its trade proportionately was within the communist block. It was much more devastated by the collapse of communism, which deprived it of its international allies and markets, while Slovenia and Croatia only gained better access to global capitalism. This problem was aggravated by the fact that for a long time, Slovenia and Croatia had been taxed to the rest of Yugoslavia (including not just Serbia but the still poorer republics like Montenegro). The army, thus, was composed mainly of Serb soldiers but paid largely by Slovenian and Croatian taxes. This helped to create the environment within which Slovenian and Croatian leaders were anxious to break away from Yugoslavia when the collapse of communism offered the option, and also the environment in which Germany would push for the very rapid recognition of their claims to independence. Since the death of Tito in 1980, Yugoslavia had been ruled, in effect, by a committee representing different nationally defined republics and, there was no one to impose unity with any authority. Western corporations (as well as diplomats) were eager for access to the "attractive" parts, and indifferent to the rest. Leaders in Slovenia and Croatia found receptive audiences both at home and abroad for more and more Western-sounding economic ideas. Meanwhile, as communism faltered and failed to inspire much loyalty—or even acceptance—among the masses (and as the Soviet Union
could afford to buy less and less of what Serbia produced), Serbian political leaders like Slobodan Milosevic turned increasingly to using Serbian nationalism to shore up their legitimacy and power. After 1989, the Slovenes and Croats were embraced in the West, Yugoslavia was dismembered, and Milosevic and others were able to mobilize panic-stricken--and increasingly economically impoverished--Serbs for their message that current problems were a Western plot, their call for national defense, and their vision of a “Greater Serbia” to include parts of Croatia and much or all of Bosnia. In some Bosnian nationalists like Radovan Karadzic, they may have thought they found only puppets or allies, but they found even more virulent and radical ethnic nationalists, with less of the practical concern for economic matters. Poor Bosnia also declared independence, and alone among all the former Yugoslavian republics, it embraced the model of a multi-ethnic, pluralist democracy with freedom of religion for everyone. You might have thought this would sound familiar to U.S. leaders, and they would support the new country that chose the political system closest to their own. But in fact, the Americans and many others found it hard to comprehend self-determination for people who did not define themselves as ethnic nationalists, and did not rush to recognize Bosnia-Herzegovina as they had Slovenia and Croatia. Moreover, the West had few economic interests in Bosnia--a beautiful country that had hosted a famous Olympic Games and attracted quite a few tourists, but that had little international trade.

As this example suggests, the problems to which nationalist rhetoric was addressed could not be limited to the international but were also clearly domestic. They were crucially domestic, as different groups contested the right to share in common the rapidly growing national wealth and the control of the government. It was only with the
rise of relatively integrated states, the idea of common membership in something called
the nation, and the belief that governmental legitimacy derives from the consent of the
governed (all relatively modern ideas) that economic inequalities could be reflected in
something like modern class differences.

The idea of national identity superseded many long-standing differentiations
among smaller polities—the Rhineland and Prussia might be considered merely as
different German regions. Equally basically, though, it superseded the division between
town and country that had been basic for most of history. Here nationalism was closely
linked to capitalism. The process of creating an integrated nation-state meant converting
the peasants of, say, Provence, Languedoc, and Burgundy into Frenchmen. This
happened partly because of state-policies—like educational standardization. It happened
just as much because industrial growth drew so many peasants into towns, and led to the
construction of roads and railroads joining small local markets into national ones, and
making possible a division of labor on a national scale. It is worth recalling how recent
the changes were, even in the best established nation-states like Britain and France. At
the beginning of the 19th century it took four days for a businessman in London to reach
his partner in Edinburgh by the fastest stage-coach—a distance that is half a day’s rail
travel today and only a little over an hour by plane. As late as the middle of the 19th
century, when the ideal of national revolution was animating Parisian Revolutionaries in
1848, less than half of Frenchmen spoke French as their everyday language. This is one
reason why peasants could be mobilized against the urban revolutionaries. But fifty years
later virtually all Frenchmen spoke French, and felt a strong enough loyalty to the French
state to cast their identity in national terms—and in two many World War I cases to die
horrible deaths in trenches arrayed against Germans whose ancestors only fifty years before thought a single German state to be a wild fantasy—or never bothered to give it a thought because they were too deeply immersed in the affairs of their farms and immediate environs.

To be German, or French, or Polish, or British, in other words, became a much more salient feature of European identities during the 19th century. This was facilitated by the development of national markets—not only selling similar consumer goods throughout the country, but hiring labor from remote parts of the country if there were shortages (or too many trade union demands) in any local setting. The markets for both labor and goods could be integrated partly because of the development of better and better communications and especially transportation infrastructures. People from different regions depended more and more on each other in actual divisions of labor and knew more and more about each other because of education, the rise of print media, and actual face-to-face contact.

The most important single source of such contact may actually have been the development of large, standing, citizen armies. Again, military service is something we take for granted, but these armies were an innovation of the Napoleonic Wars. Before the 19th century, citizens armies had been created almost exclusively in domestic conflicts, like the English Civil War or the American side of the Revolutionary War. International conflicts (like the British side of the civil war) were fought by mercenaries, often hired in foreign lands (as the British hired Hessians to fight in America), and by troops conscripted against their will as dynastic subjects not national citizens. These were led by aristocrats not professional soldiers; to be an officer was a class right, not a personal
accomplishment. The first World War marked the last hurrah for these aristocratic officers’ corps just as it marked the culmination of a process that had turned warfare into a matter of total mobilization fought by citizen armies and backed by the civilian societies’ industrial production and transport systems.

National markets, improved communications (organized largely on national lines in accord with linguistic differentiations), and actual contact such as that among citizen-soldiers all not only made different members of nation states more familiar with each other, they actually made them more similar to each other. This was a crucial part of the process of forming integrated nations. A crucial dimension of this was the destruction of highly local crafts in favor of more nationally integrated occupational categories. The introduction of new technology and factory organization facilitates this, and indeed helped to put workers not just of different locales but different nations in similar on-the-job circumstances. But unions and virtually all workers organizations were national (or occasionally, regional within relatively large nations). And workers were shaped not just by the technical exigencies of their work but by their participation in national culture. Indeed, much of the struggle of 19th and early 20th century trade unions and workers’ parties was not directly for economic benefits like better wages or health care, but for the right of full participation in national affairs: for eliminating property restrictions on voting, and ensuring access to free public education. As Bauer remarked in 1907, foreseeing some of the forces that would lead workers to side with their nations rather than the international working class:
Modern capitalism begins gradually to distinguish the lower classes in each nation more sharply from each other, for these classes too gain access to national education, to the cultural life of their nation, and to the national language.\footnote{Otto Bauer, \textit{Die Nationalitätenfrage und die Sozialdemokratie}, excerpted in T. Bottomore, ed.: \textit{Austro-Marxism} (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), p. 102.}

Indeed, the phenomenon of national language is relatively modern. Historically, of course, Latin was the main language of long-distance and cross-dynastic communication in Europe—and even that French patriot Jean d’Armagnac (otherwise an ally of Jean d’Arc) confessed in 1844 that he preferred to negotiate with the English in Latin because he did “not know French well, especially to write.” As Greenfeld has remarked, the French of Paris was the \textit{international language} of the upper classes hundreds of years before it was the national language of the common people.\footnote{Leah Greenfeld: \textit{Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity} (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992), p. 98.} In much of Eastern Europe, the nobility spoke a language peasants could not understand, and learned only a smattering of the local languages for giving household orders. It was primarily in the 19th century that speaking “national” languages—like Magyar in Hungary—became a matter of self-definition for elites and encouraged a sense of commonality with the masses (and it was in this same era that scholars began to pursue linguistic standardization through philological inquiry, publication of dictionaries, and systematic orthography—processes that were somewhat older in England and America—lest we forget that Noah Webster was a real person).

Growing cultural similarity could appear in surprising dimensions of life. Take fertility as an example. Having children involves lots of culturally influenced decisions
and behaviors--how early sexual relations and childbearing should begin, for example, how many children a family should have, how these should be spaced, and how important it is for a couple to wed before they conceive their first child--as opposed to before that child is born. Before the mid to late 19th century, all these behaviors varied more between urban and rural areas and among counties and provinces within each European state than they did between countries. There was no distinctive pattern of national differences; even whether a country was predominantly Catholic or Protestant had no substantial statistical effect. Local conditions and local traditions were the key factors.

But from the middle of the 19th century, in most of Europe (a little earlier in some places, a little later elsewhere) national differences began to emerge. French families began consistently to be larger than English, for example, regardless of county or province. Germans encouraged later marriage, and so forth. It is crucial to realize that the other side of international differences is domestic homogeneity. In other words, the fertility patterns of each country were becoming more uniform. National culture was superseding local variation.

Now let us recall the former Yugoslavia and the horrors of ethnic cleansing. Part of what Serbian nationalists were trying to achieve by rape, murder and terror was precisely the uniformity of national culture that was produced over a much longer period in France. Markets, communication and transportation infrastructures, and shared military service are more attractive than murder and rape. But let us not think the process of national integration was all peaceful in France or other Western European countries. France is familiar as one of Europe’s best integrated countries, with citizens fiercely defensive of their language and cuisine, worried about Islamic immigrants who may
dilute the national culture. Yet this homogeneity was forged not just by a highly
centralized educational system but by wars of conquest in which kings—especially
Bourbons—extended their rule from their base throughout what is now claimed as the
“natural” hexagon of France, eventually subduing the threats from Dukes of Normandy
who were also Kings of England, and Dukes of Burgundy whose power was sometimes
greater than that of France. We—along with millions of French people—recall Joan of Arc
today as a paradigmatic example of a patriot, unusually because she was a woman—a girl,
perhaps—but distinguished largely because she was willing to give her life for her king
and country. But Joan’s death in the Hundred Years’ War was not part of a simple
struggle between France, as we now know it, and England. It was part of a struggle for
succession to the crown in which the two claimants were members of a single family, the
Englishness of one branch of which was defined more by its Protestantism than by its
language or ethnicity. The Hundred Years’ War was part of the massive series of civil
wars and upheavals large and small that followed on the religious conflict known (to
Protestants) as the Protestant Reformation. And if Joan was willing to die that France
might be more fully French and more purely Catholic, many of her compatriots were
willing to kill for the same goal. The famous 1572 massacre of Huguenots, La St.
Barthélemy, was a pogrom as fierce as most in the former Soviet Union, launched against
Protestants by the Valois King Charles IX and his mother—a French “patriot” of
Florentine extraction. So fierce were the attacks that the Italian Queen Mother felt
compelled to plead that this was a kind of fratricide. “Frenchmen should not think of
other Frenchmen as Turks.9 Such attacks continued three hundred years later as the religious rulers of France sought to exterminate followers of the Albigensian heresy.

France was in part made by such “religious--and partially ethnic--cleansing”. By the late 19th century, a prominent French patriot and important theorist of nationalism, Ernst Renan would argue that while it was academically true that such acts of violence helped to form the nation, it was important for ordinary people to forget them and take the nation as given, not violently created:

Forgetting, I would even go so far as to say historical error, is a crucial factor in the creation of a nation, which is why progress in historical studies often constitutes a danger for [the principle of] nationality. Indeed, historical enquiry brings to light deeds of violence which took place at the origin of all political formations, even those whose consequences have been altogether beneficial.

Unity is always effected by means of brutality.10 We may not agree with Renan that the principle of nationality is important enough to defend by means of such forgetting--most of us, I suspect, think for example that the Holocaust is something that must be remembered not only to honor the dead but as a cautionary tale. Renan’s historical generalization seems, however, to be sound.

The “brutality” Renan had in mind is exemplified by the massacres of Protestants and putative heretics, but the cultural or symbolic violence (Bourdieu 1990) involved in forging unity could also be brutal. The eradication of once quasi-autonomous cultures, or

their reduction to mere regional dialects or local customs is continually echoed in the subordination of once vital (and perhaps still important) differences in the construction of national histories. Anderson (1991: 201) summarizes one English version:

English history textbooks offer the diverting spectacle of a great Founding Father whom every schoolchild is taught to call William the Conqueror. The same child is not informed that William spoke no English, indeed could not have done so, since the English language did not exist in his epoch; nor is he or she told 'Conqueror of what?'. For the only intelligible modern answer would have to be 'Conqueror of the English,' which would turn the old Norman predator into a more successful precursor of Napoleon and Hitler.

And what of the United States? The very "War between the States" was a material struggle over national unity, of course, and symbolically it has helped ever since to constitute a common American history for descendants of those killed on both sides of that bloody conflict (as well as for Americans whose ancestors arrived later or kept their distance). This is one reason why the theme of fratricide is so prominent in narratives of the war. That brother fought brother helps to establish that both sides were really members of one family. It is no accident that the "Pledge of Allegiance" which I learned as a schoolchild, and which is now making a comeback after some years of neglect, was created as a post-Civil War ritual.

To sum up, much of what we now think of as the peaceful patriotism of "our kind" of country is the result of earlier bloody histories. What we think of as the settled, almost natural national identities are the results of symbolic struggles and cultural
violence. Not only violence, to be sure. National identity and common histories are also the result of cultural creativity—the writing of novels that millions want to read, the shared exposure to television programs, common experiences like the trauma of the Vietnam War or the Kennedy assassination all join to make people feel part of a common history with each other. But when we evaluate the cultural clashes that make it hard for today’s (hopefully) developing countries to move towards democratic political systems, we should remember that it is often hard to accomplish in a generation what took hundreds of years elsewhere, and the attempt to do so is especially likely to be violent.

The process of consolidating states was, in short, long and far from automatic. It was historically conflict-ridden in the states we now think of as stable democracies, just as it is conflict-ridden in emerging states. But states also developed as the primary arenas for popular political participation and the creation of democratic institutions. Indeed, it was precisely because modern states were based on citizens not subjects that their cultural politics were so violent. Historical empires were relatively effective at enabling people of different ethnic groups to live together in peace. In and around the Ottoman capital of Istanbul, for example, Jews, Christians, and Muslims both lived and traded with each other. But peace was relatively easy because the different groups were not called upon to join in common deliberations about government or public affairs; the Sultan consulted advisors of various ethnic groups, but not the ordinary people. While members of various groups might be conscripted into his armies, these were not citizen armies and there was

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no mass mobilization for military efforts. Likewise, while the Ottoman empire (like other empires) maintained the peace vital to long-distance trade, it did not in itself produce a real economic integration among its diverse territories. It did not transform the division of labor, for example, or generate a great deal of technical innovation. This meant that most of the different communities and peoples under Ottoman rule continued to pursue their traditional and mainly local economic activities. Metropolitan merchants traded over long distances mainly in luxury goods. Otherwise, the various countries remained more or less self-contained local economies. Even within a country like Britain, this was the case until the era of the industrial revolution (including the explosion of agricultural and craft productivity that immediately preceded factory production). There was some regional division of labor based on differences in mineral endowment, agricultural potential of the land, and local craft specializations. But markets meant physical places to which local people went to trade mainly with other local people; only certain relatively specialized goods were manufactured for national consumption.

The beginnings of today's economic globalization, in short, lie not only in the very long distance trade of the early modern era, but in the development of the transportation infrastructure and economic integration of the modern state. There was a cultural politics always attendant on this integration of dispersed territories into nation states, and while its battles were not often as dramatic as those of soldiers, it was as important as military conquest in producing the contemporary pattern of national identities and state polities.

But the global context has changed. The globe is much more fully integrated into a single international economy than it was even a few years ago, let alone one or two
hundred. Not only does much more trade take place across state boundaries, but much more economic production is internationally organized—like Ford's World car or the IBM microcomputers that carry the tag "made in America" even though 60% of their components originate overseas.

At the same time, we confuse ourselves if we think this is totally new and unprecedented. There have been a variety of sensationalistic popular books making the case that the nation state as we know it is about to disappear because it has been rendered obsolete by the global economy. Most offer the impression that this globalization is radically new, that state-based capitalism had been stable for hundreds of years and only suddenly in the era of microchips and satellites had the economy become global. We are on much firmer ground if we recognize that extending the reach of economic integration has been a long-term trend of the entire modern era, that it is one of the basic features of capitalism. This reach has been extended simultaneously by linking the local economies of regions within nation-states more firmly into the national economy and by developing very large-scale links that transcended national boundaries. Until the early 20th century, those large scale links were primarily operated by individuals, families, or companies who made their base in single countries and drew on their home states for military and political support. The British East India Company is a classic example. Long distance trade and colonialism shared the feature that they relied heavily on specific metropolitan nodes for accomplishing global integration. Goods were shipped from one colony or remote trading site to London, for example, and from there to another colony or trading partner. There were few direct links.
This is what has changed alongside the enormous increase in the volume of international activity. Trade flows laterally and much more directly. China sends goods to Africa; India sends goods to the Middle East without them passing through the ports of any European (or North American) country. But this does not mean that all global economic activity bypasses Europe and America. Rather, it means that the spatial organization of power is no longer symmetrical with the spatial flows of goods. Operating globally, firms like Ford and General Motors are nonetheless managed primarily in the US. They organize production activities and trade all around the world, but they do it by communicating from relatively spatially compact US settings--Detroit in this case, New York or Los Angeles in others. While trade is much more widely dispersed, thus, control and capital accumulation remain highly spatially concentrated.

There is change, of course. The growth of Japan, the East Asian Tigers, and more recently China itself reminds us that the distribution of global economic power does not remain constant. But it is crucial to realize that the extraordinary growth of the various successful East Asian economies represents an exception among the poorer countries of the world. They have caught up--or are catching up--with Europe and North America (in part by means of successful government policies including not only trade manipulations but building of infrastructure and strong support for education). But overall, the gap between rich and poor countries has actually increased, not decreased. Let me be even more specific: South Asia, and Latin America all grew richer during the last twenty years, but they did not grow richer as fast as Western Europe and North America, let alone as fast as East Asia. And Africa actually grew poorer in absolute terms. It is hard
to say about Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union because of poor statistics, but whatever their prospects for future growth it seems likely that they suffered stagnation during the last decade of communism and have probably lost ground overall since 1990.

It is in this context of (a) the global spread of Western dominated consumer culture, (b) the construction of a global capitalist organization of production and long-distance distribution in which power and profits remain concentrated even while operations are dispersed, and (c) enormous global inequality, that the current upheavals of cultural politics flourish. The state is in no sense disappearing in all of this. It has lost some of its historic powers, such as control over its own money supply which is eroded by rapid, computerized international trade not just of currency but of debt instruments—a trade that often leaves governments appearing to be more concerned about the “guidance” they receive from world financial markets than that they receive from their own citizens. States are hemmed in also by various international agreements ranging from GATT and now the WTO to human rights accords and regional or sectional institutions such as NATO or the European Community. But control of the state, or the capacity to create a state, is in fact what is at stake in many of the struggles defined in terms of cultural politics such as nationalism and religious fundamentalism.

This is so not merely because people are confused, but because states still matter. Most crucially, they are the primary vehicle for large scale citizen participation in the modern world. In other words, if there is to be democracy, for the time being it will be organized in the institutional structures of states. The global economy has its elements of freedom—you may buy whatever you can afford, generally speaking, and if you have

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wealth invest it almost however you want. But it is not organized as a democracy, or through a set of institutions that enable ordinary people to participate in making collective decisions about how their lives will be shaped. To be effective in relation to the global economy, people act primarily through states.

To grasp why people want a “state of their own,” thus, we do not need to posit some universal human need for large-scale collective identity, or claim that “modern societies produce some kind of ontological insecurity as a consequence of the uncertainty and fragmentation that lie at their core.”13 Certainly people need identity, but knowing this does nothing to tell us why they fixate on any particular scale or definition of identity. And certainly people seek sources of ontological security when faced with social contradictions and an unpredictable world, but people have faced insecurities throughout history, and found solace in families, communities, and religions as well as nations. We can grasp most of the motivations for the cultural politics we see in the contemporary world in terms of the pursuit of control over the forces shaping people’s lives. The attempt to have a state of one’s own necessarily means the pursuit of both a sense of internal belonging and a sense of external limits, of borders. Belonging need not be achieved by ethnic cleansing or any other complete homogenization of the population but it does require a certain feeling at home. Borders need not be rigid and impermeable; immigrants may be allowed and with “naturalization” achieve the same rights as indigenous citizens, but some criteria of membership will be required to make a participatory state functional (unlike, say, an empire which can rule territories and the

people living in those territories without worrying about which of them are entitled to vote or in other senses are members).

I have suggested that the motivations for cultural politics may be understood largely in terms of the pursuit of control over the conditions shaping people's lives. I do not mean to suggest that such cultural politics are always effective ways to pursue this control, that they are based on rationally developed or empirically sound understandings of how global and other forces are organized, or that cultural politics are not also structured by the ambitions of leaders or the distortions of ideologues. But I do mean to suggest that the specific history of creation of large scale states and global capitalism has eroded most people's capacity to exert significant direct control over many of the most important forces affecting them in basic ways—afflicting whether they have jobs, can feed their children, go to war, or are able to live in accord with the teachings of their religions. Even if one lives in a very small town, the factors driving one's living conditions work largely on a much broader scale. To try to control these factors, people act indirectly, especially through social movements and governmental institutions.

The cultural politics of nationalism and religious fundamentalism are among the ways in which people respond indirectly to their incorporation into relatively large polities and a global economy in which power is real but mobilized from distant and sometimes obscure centers. The political scientist Benjamin Barber is one of those who has recently popularized the idea of an end to the nation-state. He writes of "Jihad" as a shorthand for all the reactionary anti-modernisms and fundamentalisms of the world, and "McWorld" as global economic integration (which he understands mainly in terms of the spread of Western consumer culture):
Jihad and McWorld operate with equal strength in opposite directions, the one driven by parochial hatreds, the other by universalizing markets, the one recreating ancient subnational and ethnic borders from within, the other making national borders from without. Yet Jihad and McWorld have this in common: they both make war on the sovereign nation-state and thus undermine the nation-state’s democratic institutions.14

This is not the place to undertake a full-scale critique of Barber’s book or the literature of which it is a part, but I want to point to a couple of deeply problematic mistakes in his conceptualization of the current links between cultural politics and global economic integration.

First, Barber assumes that what he terms “Jihad” is a reaction of small and relatively homogenous entities. But Islam—his primary example—is neither small nor homogenous. Islam’s billion adherents are citizens of dozens of countries; many are fiercely patriotic at a national level while others profess loyalty only to the whole community of faith Umma Islam. The largest Islamic country, after all, is Indonesia. It is not immune to fundamentalist currents, but it is also extraordinarily different from Iran or Iraq—as they are from Algeria and Pakistan. In each case, Islam is interwoven with local and national cultural traditions, histories, disputes, and patriotisms. And each of the countries I just mentioned has a different dominant language from the others; only one is Arabic-speaking (to tweak a popular stereotype and confusion). Islam, like Christendom and Communism at different times, is the ideological glue of a world-system of its own—on a scale more comparable to global capitalism than to narrow nationalisms.

Despite the fact that they find it far easier to spread messages by means of modern communication technology, Muslims today are somewhat less unified than, say, Christians in the era of the Crusades (when, among other things, Western European Catholics were disappointed to find Eastern and Greek Orthodox Christians relatively indifferent to their fundamentalist adventure). In the case of Islamic fundamentalism, as of all religious fundamentalisms, there are people who think that there is one simple truth and that everyone ought to follow precisely the same understanding of that single truth that they have. In other words, there are people who would like Islam to be homogenous. But they do not agree amongst themselves about the definition of the single truth which everyone ought to believe. There are Sunni and Shi’a and divisions within each; there are debates as to whether Ismaili are really Muslims. An Egyptian student of mine two years ago argued with me at length that it was wrong to describe the Ayatollah Khomeini and his Shi’ite followers as fundamentalists because they were fundamentally wrong: only a Sunni Muslim could be a fundamentalist because only they followed the true law. What Barber fails to realize, is that while in the modern world many people find ideologies that claim homogeneity very appealing, this does not mean that if fact those people are homogenous with each other.

Second, Barber greatly overestimates the extent to which fundamentalisms and reactionary ethnic nationalisms are rooted in ancient identities which are fairly clear to those involved. He fails to consider fully the process of creation and ideological manipulation that brings various such identity claims to the political forefront—how, for example, 19th century Serbian intellectuals seeking freedom from the Hapsburg Empire paved the way for the manipulations of Milosevic and Karadzic in the context of the
collapse of communism by trying to exaggerate the ancient roots of their ethnic distinctiveness and give it contemporary form in new linguistic divisions. He does not see that part of what is going on in Islamic fundamentalism today is a struggle over the definition of Islam, not simply a reaction of Muslims to modernization. The Khomeini’s are fighting against not only secularists and foreign influences such as global capitalism, they are fighting against modernizing Muslims. They are attacking intellectuals who claim the right to make their own interpretations of the Koran, advocates of women’s rights who point to the fact that the Koran at least arguably gives women a number of rights that male-dominated Islamic courts and families deny them. They are trying to enshrine one definition of the faith as the only acceptable one—and theirs may in many ways be as new as some of those they attack.15 Among those they have attacked, advocates of mass literacy and critical reinterpretation of sacred texts loom very large (and this helps to explain why they were so eager to mobilize non-readers against Salman Rushdie’s novel, *The Satanic Verses*). (Does this remind anyone of some of the fights in 16th and 17th century Christianity—and their echoes today?)

Third, on the side of what he calls “McWorld,” Barber tells one-sidedly the story of global homogenization—without considering the ways in which global capitalism itself creates the settings for new forms of cultural creativity and the production of new differences. Were people really more free and more heterogeneous in their cultural tastes when nearly all of them were peasants? The spread of capitalism into China, for example, does bring new commonalities between Chinese buyers of Kentucky Fried

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15 See Michael Fischer and ___, *Debating Islam,* and for an Indonesian case study of the processes of modernization within Islam, see John Bowen, *Modernizing Muslims.*
Chicken and those in Seattle. But it also allows for the development of a variety of taste cultures within China. It allows for some teenagers to prefer to listen to rock music—admittedly a Western import at first, but now produced by a wide range of Chinese artists, some of whom like Cui Jian articulate a vision of China at odds not just with many of their elders but with the communist party.¹⁶ If McWorld eliminates the difference between Szechuan and Cantonese cooking, that will be a loss. But that is not the only trend global trade encourages.

Fourth, it is not so sure that the nation-state is simply bound to disappear as global capitalism (or cultural resistance) increases. I have already argued that states are among the most important tools and objects of struggle for those who wish to pursue nationalism and similar agendas in cultural politics. States also play a crucial role in contemporary global capitalism—though not entirely the same one they have played historically. As Saskia Sassen has put it:

This duality [global-national] is conceived as a mutually exclusive set of terrains where what the global economy gains the national economy or the national state loses.¹⁷

Sassen shows a much more complex relationship between globalization and nations or states. For example, the more globalized firms become, the more their central office

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¹⁶ Without giving any serious evidence, Barber dismisses the much more persuasive arguments of Orlando Patterson that “world musical homogenization” is simply not occurring. Barber actually does not consider the production of music or systematic studies of audiences, but rather notes anecdotally that MTV content is disproportionately American even in non-English-speaking countries. Barber, 105; see Patterson, “Ecumenical America: Global culture and the American cosmos,” *World Policy Journal*, 11(2), pp. 103-117. See also Paul Gilroy for a critique of the illusions of the idea of “authentic culture,” including in music, and an account of how musicians of African descent creatively mixed different influences in different settings in Europe and America; *The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993).
functions grow—in importance, in complexity, and in number of transactions. Yet these central functions tend to remain nationally concentrated. Moreover, where states no longer act as enforcers of economic policy and regulators of corporate action, this does not mean that a vacuum arises. On the contrary, declining state regulation is generally closely tied to rising levels of litigation and other forms of legalization. Some of this is handled in international forums—e.g. those created by the WTO or the International Court of Justice in the Hague. In many cases, firms can only gain access to these forums when cases are brought up by recognized governments. Even more importantly, by far the largest amount of international corporate litigation is heard in the courts of national states. International law, in this sense, is not simply the law of public relations between states, but the law patched together from different national legal systems for dealing with private relations—largely between economic actors—from different (and sometimes multiple) states. Not least of all, some of the crucial institutions for pursuing the growth and strength of a global economy—e.g. the World Bank—are in fact products of member states and reflect not the weakness of those states before global forces, but a consensus that global economic integration and growth is a good thing.

* In this context, claims to constitute a legitimate actor on the international stage become more, not less, important. Though they are not without competitors, national states remain the primary exemplars of such legitimate actors. National states also remain the primary arenas within which citizens can pursue justice as individuals, and both as individuals and as collectively organized, can participate in the process of self-

determination—that is, of determining more or less democratically what kinds of lives they want to live together.

It is worth noting that labor struggles have not been only about wages as a source of more consumer goods. They have been about security, about the protection of local communities from destruction, and in general about workers’ attempts to gain some autonomous control over the kinds of lives they want to lead. The motivations between local community resistance to national capital and national resistance to international capital are not far apart.

It is clear that national identities and nationalist rhetorics will be among the most important ways in which workers try to respond to the economic challenges they face from capitalist globalization. It is less clear what this means for tactics. The pervasiveness of the globalization of economic production suggests that a simple economic nationalism is unlikely to succeed; there is no pure “going it alone.” Workers will have to think internationally. In this connection, we should bear in mind that most foreign direct investment does not conform to the classic “deindustrialization” model suggesting that capital flows from the rich to the poor countries seeking cheaper labor. Most flows from one highly-developed economy to another, from one OECD member to another.¹⁸ It reflects not simply a search for cheaper labor but a structural globalization of investment and production—and for that matter markets.

Global organization of “corporate campaigns” may be among the most promising of union tactics. Strikes are undercut by globalization, but public relations and investor-

¹⁸ See the dissertation research of Arthur Alderson, Dept. of Sociology, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (publication forthcoming).
targeting are not (or much less so). This is important, because unions (and others) seeking will need to remind workers around the world that 'worker' is an important identity, and to suggest ways in which it can complement the identities or citizen or national (or for that matter religious and gender identities). Last but not least, the cultural politics of economic globalization suggests that narrow interest group collective-action—protecting the benefits of skilled workers and the already unionized—will be an even worse tactic in the future than it has been in the past. Unions will need broad public support in their home countries in order to forge effective international policies. Unions will need to be—or to join with—broader social movements in order to influence politics. Far from vanishing, states (whether or not the remain governed by the rhetoric of nationhood) will remain the primary arenas for democratic collective action, the most important focal points for public opinion to influence institutional power.